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1. Foreword 
In this number: 
Madrid Employment Report 
(Contribution of the 
ECO/FIN-Council*) 
The European Summit of Essen in December 1994 has put forward the 
coordinates of a European strategy for employment. Following the Summit 
conclusions, the ECO/FIN- and the Social-Affairs-Council, as well as the 
Commission, have established reports which translated the ''five Essen points" 
into concrete policy guidelines. The recommendations therein have then been 
summarised in a joint report which was endorsed by the European Council in 
Madrid. Member States' commitment to tackling unemployment led to the 
adoption of multiannual employment programmes at the national level. The 
implementation of the Madrid recommendations and the monitoring of the 
multiannual programmes will form the backbone of the follow-up in 1996 of the 
European employment policy. 
The Report of the ECO/FIN-Council, which was prepared by the Economic 
Policy Committee, provides a thorough analysis of the unemployment problems 
of the European Union and presents the main elements of the macroeconomic 
strategy and the structural measures to be implemented in the combat against 
unemployment in the EU. The Report reviews the national employment policies 
along the five points of the labour market strategy agreed at Essen. It also 
comprises the requested specific reports on the impact of the tax/benefit systems 
on the incentives to create and to take up a job, as well as on the relationship 
between economic growth and environment. These specific reports are attached 
in annex I and IL respectively. 
The Report envisages a twin-track strategy in which macroeconomic and 
structural policies combine to face the double challenge of eradicating 
unemployment whilst preserving the equity objectives of the European social 
model and concludes with a number of policy recommendations for further 
action, to be implemented by each Member State subject to different needs, in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. 
* This contribution has been transmitted to the Madrid European Council together with the Single Report on 
Employment elaborated by the Council and the Commission. 
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MADRID EMPLOYMENT REPORT 
(Contribution of the ECO/FIN-Council*) 
2. Employment and the General Economic 
Framework: Macroeconomic context and Role 
of Structural Policies 
2.1 The overall strategy for employment 
The most prominent factors behind the insufficient level of em-
ployment reflected by high unemployment are 
- a lack of sustained high economic growth over several years, 
- serious rigidities in goods and services markets due to over-
regulation and insufficient competition, 
- regulatory barriers to the efficient working of labour markets, 
- a mismatch between the skills offered by the labour force and 
the changing needs in the labour market due to technological 
developments, 
_ a disparity between the total labour cost for the low skilled and 
the value of the products or services they provide to the 
markets, and 
- finally, the relative high tax burden on labour. 
There are clear indications that a considerable part of unem-
ployment is becoming structural and persistent at a very high 
level in most Member States, and that vigorous efforts are 
necessary both in the areas of macroeconomic and structural 
policy. 
In order to make decisive progress in the employment situation, 
a period of sustained and strong medium-term growth process 
will be needed. This will secure that potential production capac-
ity is available for the higher employment to occur, as well as 
will ease the implementation of the necessary structural re-
forms. A successful strategy requires a coordinated action in-
cluding increased investment in productive capacities, further 
progress towards price stability both largely dependent on an 
adequate wage development and, above all, the progressive but 
firm reduction in public deficits in most Member States. 
The macroeconomic strategy must be accompanied by further 
structural reforms in both product and services markets and in 
the labour markets of each Member State. Both the macroeco-
nomic policy and the structural reforms are part of a global strat-
egy for job creation, and substantial benefits will be reaped from 
a reinforced mutual coordination between these policy tracks. 
2.2 Macroeconomic policies for growth and 
employment 
The successive Broad Economic Guidelines adopted by the 
Council since December 1993 and the Essen strategy have laid 
down the policy objectives and the broad thrust of the macro-
economic policies required to achieve the Union's two major 
objectives. For the Community and the Member States it is now 
essential to turn the present economic development into a 
strong, non-inflationary medium-term growth and employ-
ment-creating process. The achievement of these objectives 
will require a stable, investment-enhancing, short- and me-
dium-term macroeconomic framework characterized by: 
• a stability-oriented monetary policy whose task should be fa-
cilitated by appropriate wage and budgetary developments and 
* This contribution has been transmitted to the Madrid European Council to-
gether with the Single Report on Employment elaborated by the Council and 
the Commission. 
which leads to further progress towards price stability and im-
proved price convergence; 
• nominal wage developments compatible with achieving and 
safeguarding a low-inflation environment and positive, but 
moderate, increases in real wages, which however, for several 
years, remain below the annual growth of labour productivity, 
leading to a further increase in capital profitability which is 
needed for the strong expansion of employment-creating in-
vestment; 
• a progressive but significant reduction in budget deficits, 
dropping in the medium term to well below the Maastricht ref-
erence value of 3 per cent of GDP, hereby contributing to a 
crowding-in of productive investment and to a significant in-
crease in national saving which is needed for a sustainable fi-
nancing of the required increase in the stock of capital. 
The macro conditions for a return to a strong employment creat-
ing growth process are now the object of a large consensus in the 
Community and are fully supported by the European Social 
Partners 1. This is an important confidence enhancing element. 
2.3 The present recovery and the medium-term 
growth process 
Since 1993, the European Community economy has exper-
ienced a soundly-based, stronger-than-expected, recovery 
from the sharp downturn it endured during the early 1990s. 
Thanks to dynamic extra-EC export markets and the improved 
competitive position of European firms, exports have acted as 
the initial driving force. Following increased signs during the 
second half of last year ( I 994) that the growth impulses coming 
from the external sector were spilling over into investment, the 
latter is set to become the main engine of output growth this year 
(1995) and next (1996). Private consumption is currently rather 
subdued but should gradually pick up in line with accelerating 
household incomes, progressively bolstered by rising employ-
ment and positive, albeit moderate, increases in real wages. 
Having reached a peak of I 1.4 per cent in mid-I 994, the rate of 
unemployment has decreased as expected along a slowly down-
ward-sloping trajectory and stands now at 10.7 per cent of the 
labour force. 
The present recovery process leaves Member States well placed 
to achieve a sustained period of strong medium-term growth. 
Indeed, the major factors shaping economic activity such as ex-
ternal demand, capital profitability, area-wide inflation, in-
terest rates and investment performance, arc still pointing in the 
right direction. 
An explicit macroeconomic condition - supplementary to those 
already mentioned under 2.2. - for a strong non-inflationary 
growth process is the continuation of the investment-led 
growth, with capital spending growing at a rate twice that of 
GDP, adequately balanced by a moderately growing private 
consumption. This would progressively raise the Community's 
current growth potential needed to ensure a high growth path 
without creating inflationary pressures emerging from produc-
tion capacity restraints. 
As employment creation is very sensitive to output growth, a 
high level of economic growth is the first and foremost import-
ant prerequisite to the necessary substantial increase in the 
number of jobs in the Community. 
"The Social Partners guidelines for turning recovery into a sustained and 
job-creating growth process", Joint Opinion elaborated by the Macroeco-
nomic Group of the Social Dialogue, 16 May 1995. 
In order to improve the effects of employment creation resulting 
from the output growth performances further contributions from 
structural policies are needed (see section 2.5). 
2.4 Macroeconomic risks to growth and employment 
Since the beginning of this year, and basically after the Spring 
currency turmoil, the economic expansion in the Community ap-
pears to be losing some steam. In itself, this is not a reason to fear 
a premature end to the current upswing. A slowdown after sev-
eral quarters of recovery is totally in keeping with historical pre-
cedents, especially since the first phase of the present cycle has 
been so strong and since the pause largely reflects a shift in the 
factors shaping the recovery process (from exports to invest-
ment). Furthermore, a temporary moderation in economic 
growth appears appropriate in view of the rapid absorption of 
slack in capacity last year. 
Nevertheless, in the short-run, some downside risks have 
gained considerable importance. Firstly, a salient external 
shock has affected the Union. Since early 1994, the US dollar 
has experienced a sharp weakening against EU currencies, 
which in combination with a lack of policy credibility in a 
number of Member States has triggered pronounced intra-EU 
exchange rate changes. Such currency misalignments are detri-
mental to the Union's short-term growth outlook since they pro-
duce noticeable, adverse, effects on exports, investment and 
confidence. In part reflecting the influence of the currency 
turbulence, most "appreciating" countries have shown a marked 
slowdown, whereas most "depreciating" countries have exper-
ienced a less severe, or even no, correction. However, also in the 
"depreciating" countries, the currency turbulences can be ex-
pected to eventually damage economic growth. 
In an number of countries there is a risk of wage increases in ex-
cess of rates consistent with the price-stability objective and 
with the needed further rise in profitability. Early this year 
(1995), the perception of this risk has contributed to postpone 
interest rate reductions. However, monetary policies were re-
laxed later when the monetary expansion and inflation were 
subsiding. Furthermore, and more importantly, progress to-
wards sounder budgetary positions has clearly been insufficient 
in several countries. While the short-run benefits of policy slip-
page are likely to be small and temporary, its medium to long-
term costs would be substantial and permanent. Indeed, if be-
cause of impatience or dissatisfaction with the present 
showdown of growth, policies were to move in the direction of a 
non-convergence scenario, medium-term growth and employ-
ment prospects in the EU would be seriously damaged. Devel-
opments on foreign exchange markets in late September amply 
demonstrated that these risks still persist. Growing uncertainties 
about the ability and resolve of several governments to rigorous-
ly implement planned fiscal consolidation efforts instantly 
prompted renewed turmoil, thereby putting an abrupt end to the 
orderly reversal of exchange rate movements experienced dur-
ing the summer. 
On the positive side, the major factors shaping economic activ-
ity are still pointing in a positive direction: (i) the strength of ex-
ternal demand remains satisfactory and the Community's com-
petitive position continues to improve; (ii) capital profitability 
remains strong and the expectation is for further significant im-
provements; (iii) area-wide inflation is markedly lower than in 
previous episodes, facilitating moderate wage agreements; and 
is unlikely to pick up much during the expansion given the mon-
etary authorities' strong commitment to price stability and in-
creased global competition and (iv) interest rates have been sub-
stantially reduced and (v) latest business surveys on investment 
intentions point to very strong investment performance. More-
over, strict adherence to planned fiscal consolidation and con-
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vergence programmes should eventually lead to a confidence-
induced fall in long-term interest rates and to a reduction in the 
risk of turbulence on foreign exchange markets. Credible fiscal 
retrenchment efforts, by lowering inflation expectations and 
short-term interest rates, would also pave the way for making 
the stability-oriented monetary policy less restrictive in some 
countries. Reinforced commitments from governments and the 
social partners would help to strengthen confidence and to allow 
for lower interest rates and a more investment friendly climate. 
2.5 Growth, employment and structural policies 
The economic recovery and the full implementation of the 
macro-economic part of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 
would eliminate cyclical unemployment in the short run and 
part of the non-cyclical unemployment in the medium term. 
However, to further reduce the non-cyclical part without ten-
sions on the labour market and start to attack the hard core of 
structural unemployment, sound macro-economic policies 
should be supplemented by structural policies aiming at making 
more efficient and employment-creating both the product and 
labour markets. 
The need for well functioning goods and services markets 
As regards policies to enhance competitiveness and innovation. 
their major aim is to increase the endogenous growth forces of 
the Union. To this end, a correct functioning of product and ser-
vice markets - inter alia through a rigorous anti-trust and com-
petition policy and action to lift legal and other constraints on 
the development of services - is also highly relevant. As set out 
by the White Paper (Chapters 2 to 7), this should be achieved by 
fully exploiting the potential of the internal market and an open 
world trading system, by accelerating the realization of the 
TENs, by investing in new technologies, by carrying through 
the Action Plan on the Information Society and by better ex-
ploiting the growth and employment potential offered by SMEs. 
Over the last year, notable progress has been made in several of 
these areas. 
These efforts would accelerate the rate of growth of the EU 
economies via increases in overall productivity. In fact, the 
growth of productivity is the major source of real income and 
wealth. As stressed in the White Paper and by the Social 
Partners, there is no contradiction between initiatives to en-
hance productivity growth and net employment creation pro-
vided that the wealth created by the sectors with high-produc-
tivity increases is adequately redistributed within the economy, 
enabling sectors with low productivity growth to create new 
jobs. Such a process also enables similar wages for similar 
qualifications in all sectors. One important market mechanism 
of redistribution of productivity gains is decreasing relative 
prices in sectors with high productivity growth, increasing the 
purchasing power for all consumers, and thus demand for prod-
ucts and services in general, and especially in employment-
intensive sectors with low productivity growth and increasing 
relative prices. This process goes along with sectoral changes 
which must be socially acceptable. Furthermore, the overall 
growth rate must be sufficiently strong in order to exploit the 
newly created potential and to ensure a positive balance be-
tween job creation and job destruction across sectors. 
Contribution of labour market policies to increase the 
employment content of growth 
With respect to labour market policies, their design and imple-
mentation must contribute to growth and employment, without 
creating tensions, and to a higher employment-content of 
growth. The impact of active and more efficient labour market 
policies operates basically through three main channels: 
• raising the quality of human capital - Since this corresponds 
to improving both the flexibility of the labour force (both 
employed and unemployed) and the competitiveness of the 
Union, actions in this field will reinforce the growth potential 
itself. While being an important ingredient of structural ad-
justment, it should be noted that like the policies for competi-
tiveness, it will generate its full benefit only when the econ-
omy is growing strongly and makes available new working 
posts. If the latter is not the case, such efforts will lead to 
frustration of the manpower that is better skilled while human 
capital continues to be destroyed by long-term unemploy-
ment; 
• promoting the employability of manpower - Measures aimed 
at improving the transparency of labour markets, at enhancing 
flexibility in the areas of professional and geographical mo-
bility or at retraining target groups hit by exclusion will facili-
tate the re-absorption of unemployed workers when the de-
mand for labour resumes. While such actions do not in 
themselves engender new jobs, their economic merit is re-
lated to their contribution to avoiding a resumption of wage 
inflation as unemployment comes down. As such, they should 
help to curb the NAIRU limit and to attack simultaneously the 
hard core of structural unemployment. Furthermore, they 
also have an important social dimension as they contribute to 
maintaining and reinforcing cohesion and social consensus in 
the Union; 
• and making growth more emplo_vment-creating - From a ma-
croeconomic point of view, the achievement of a more la-
bour-intensive growth process essentially means that more 
employment (in number of persons employed) will be gener-
ated by any given growth rate of real GDP. In purely statistical 
terms, it implies a lowering of the growth rate of apparent la-
bour productivity (measured as real GDP growth per occupied 
person). Obviously, such an outcome should not be reached by 
destroying productivity at the firm or sector level since this 
would severely affect the economy's competitive position and 
the overall wealth creation process. 
Macroeconomically, the employment-content of growth may 
be increased by an evolution of relative factor prices which fa-
vours the use of labour with respect to capital. The realization of 
such an effect through changes in overall relative factor prices 
is, however, likely to take a considerable amount of time and 
may be accompanied by unpleasant side effects. Apart from this 
macroeconomic substitution process, there are basically two 
other approaches to increasing the employment-content of 
growth; one dealing with labour costs and another with working 
time. 
As regards labour costs, a widening of the wage distribution at 
the lower end would make low-productivity activities profit-
able that were formerly either priced out of the official market or 
"transferred" to foreign low-wage producers and would thus in-
crease the labour content of growth. This downward widening 
of the wage scale may be obtained either as in the US by allow-
ing market pressures to substantially lower the wages of low-
skilled workers, but with serious social consequences (the 
"working poor" syndrome) or by a set of more pragmatic actions 
which reform the European social model and which are targeted 
at the low end of the wage scale. These measures would include 
special entry wages for new entrants into the labour markets, a 
review of social benefit systems acting as implicit wage floors 
and reductions in non-wage costs especially at the low end of 
the wage scale. The latter measures tend to minimize the impact 
on net wage incomes but have significant budgetary conse-
quences which call for compensatory measures. 
In the field cJf' workinx time and work organization, the basic 
issue is to increase the flexibility of working time. A compul-
sory, across the board and massive reduction in working time 
would not provide a satisfactory answer in view of its implica-
-
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tions for future productive capacities, wage levels and the 
post-2000 demographic evolution. These adverse effects may, 
however, be avoided in the case of flexible measures of working 
time reduction at the microeconomic level which are warranted 
by local conditions and socially accepted by all parties. These 
measures should, however, be reversible if new economic 
conditions warrant it. Such measures, as well as those designed 
to make full use of the potential of voluntary part-time work, 
should be promoted. Finally, the negative consequences of re-
duced working hours on potential output may be alleviated and 
even reversed by shift-work arrangements aiming at de-coupl-
ing capital hours from labour hours. However, this instrument 
cannot be applied in a general way since, beside its important 
social dimension, only firms which confront supply constraints 
and have available an adequate "reserve" of usable manpower 
would be able to benefit from it. 
Finally, the promotion of local employment initiatives could 
augment the labour-content of growth. Although presented as a 
separate instrument in the Essen strategy, they operate through 
the same economic mechanisms as described above or through 
subsidizing some of these activities. 
There are thus pragmatic ways to achieve a higher labour con-
tent of growth via a lowering of wage-costs and a reform of 
working time, together with the promotion of new fields of acti-
vities, without calling into question fundamental social values. 
However, these actions must not hamper the growth process it-
self and should thus not be in contradiction with the need to en-
hance the Union's competitiveness and the required fiscal con-
solidation. 
3. Labour market functioning and employment 
creation 
3.1 Unemployment in the European Union 
The rate of unemployment in many Member States has tended to 
increase over the successive economic cycles recorded since the 
TABLE I : Main Features of the Unemployment in the EU, 1994 
Unemploy-
ment rate 
of total la-
bour force 
EUR12 l l ,4 
B 9,6 
DK 8,0 
D 8,7 
GR 8,9 
E 24,3 
F 12.7 
IRL 14,7 
I 11,3 
L 3.5 
NL 7.2 
A 3,9 1) 
p 6,7 
FIN 18.5 
s 8,111 
UK 9,7 
* (15-24 yrs). 
I) 1993. 
Share of Jong-
term unem-
ployed2l 
among all un-
employed 
48,l 
58.3 
32,l 
44.3 
50.5 
52,7 
37.5 
59.l 
61.5 
29.6 
49.4 
15,6 
43.4 
21.4 
9,7 
45.4 
2) unemployed for more than 12 months. 
Share of those 
with low 
educational 
leveJ3J among 
unemployed 
49.9 
5 ].8 
30.6 
21.9 
40,0 
67.9 
46.4 
63.5 1) 
58.7 
62.8 
3].7 
78.7 
58.0 
Unemploy-
ment rate 
for 
'youth'* 
22.0 
21,8 
10,2 
9.0 
27.7 
45,I 
28.8 
23.0 
31.6 
7,9 
l ].3 
3.5 
14.5 
32,5 
1s.24J 
16.3 
3) educational level lower than upper secondary; share calculated for per-
sons aged 15 to 59 years. 
4) Sweden uses age group 16-24 years. 
Source: EUROSTAT Labour Force Survey 1994 and National 
Statistical Institutes for A, S, FIN. 
mid seventies. Thus, the job creation generated during the ex-
pansionary phases has not been able to compensate the employ-
ment losses experienced during the recessions, thus increasing 
structural unemployment. More recently, the downturn of the 
economic activity of the early nineties has led to a level of 
unemployment equivalent to the levels of the early eighties in 
all Member States, thereby offsetting the progress made in em-
ployment creation in the second half of the decade. As stated in 
section 2, the current economic upturn has failed so far to pro-
duce a decisive increase in the employment content of growth. 
The recent surge in unemployment presents some new features 
when compared with previous recessions. First, the growth in 
unemployment has affected all countries, comprising those so 
far broadly preserved from this problem. Second, for the first 
time, new layers of the labour force have been hit by the con-
tingency of becoming unemployed, namely the middle manage-
ment, medium-skilled and technical labour. Finally, and most 
distinctly, it has become apparent that the incidence of unem-
ployment is particularly high in the case of disadvantaged cat-
egories of labour (e.g. females, low skilled, youngsters, older 
workers, extra-EU immigrants, etc.). 
A core of long-term, hard-to-place unemployed is growing in 
almost all Member States, made up of individuals who, in most 
cases, have lower-than-average skills or are youngsters (see 
Table 1). The lack of employability of this labour is a most 
worrying development since these individuals would hardly 
benefit even from a period of sustained job creation, as the ex-
perience of the expansion of the late eighties in the European 
Community has shown. 
Unemployment and labour cost rigidity 
An important aspect of the unemployment problem relates to a 
discrepancy between productivity and cost for certain cat-
egories of labour. By and large, this lower productivity of labour 
is associated with two categories of individuals, partly overlap-
ping, namely low-qualified workers and new entrants to the la-
bour market. 
The incidence of unemployment across labour categories tends 
to be higher the lower the individual's level of education. This is 
linked to the fact that low-skilled labour has become relatively 
expensive when compared to higher skilled labour or higher-
technology capital equipment, and that there is a higher demand 
for skilled labour induced by the accelerated technological 
change and fiercer overall competition in the markets. 
The high rates of unemployment an1ong the first-job seekers 
points to the fact that changes in the labour market may be rais-
ing barriers for new entrants to have access to work, in a context 
of growing participation rates (e.g. females, youths, extra-EU 
immigrants) in most Member States. 
Besides wages, non-wage and 'screening' costs, any new re-
cruit involves other additional costs related, for instance, to the 
lack of work experience or the need to adapt to the specific tasks 
required by the job. The total of these 'entry costs', which can be 
seen as an short-run investment by the employer, has seemingly 
increased because of e.g. a bigger skill mismatch between la-
bour upply and demand, an excessively low mobility of labour, 
or the inefficient functioning of the mechanisms of job matching. 
The changes highlighted above explain that the employability 
of low-skilled labour and new entrants has apparently dimin-
ished as their productivity would no longer warrant the total cost 
of their utilization. This insufficient productivity has not been 
offset by the evolution of total cost of labour in the European 
Union, which has shown a marked lack of responsiveness to 
changes in the economic cycle. 
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The financing needs of the public sector over the past two dec-
ades have resulted in a growing tax wedge between total cost 
paid by the employer and the net djsposable income received by 
the employee. Within the tax wedge, non-wage costs represent 
a substantial share of the total cost of labour in most of the 
Member States, up to some 50 per cent of total cost for an aver-
age worker in F, B, I and A in 1992. Since non-wage costs have 
important fixed components (e.g. paid days not worked, less 
than proportional social charges, etc.), they weigh relatively 
more on the lower paid and contribute to introducing a higher 
rigidity in their total cost. 
Furthermore, the presence of 'wage floors ' have prevented a 
downward adjustment of nominal wages in respon e to the 
changes in labour productivity. They also help explaining the 
relatively compressed wage hierarchy in Europe compared with 
that in other economies (especially, the US). These 'wage 
floors' may also have acted as a barrier for creating jobs at the 
lower end of the wage scale (e.g. part-time) and for less produc-
tive labour, especially new entrants, to find work. 
3.2 Social Benefits and Labour Taxation at the Lower 
End of the Wage Scale: summary of main findings 
The problem of 'implicit' wage floors (other than statutory or 
collectively-agreed pay minima) appears to be partially linked 
to the degree of protection provided through benefits of income 
support by generating an excessively small difference in net dis-
posable incomes in and out of work or by allowing for a long 
stay on benefit. 
Under certain circumstances, the combination of entitlement to 
benefits and the tax regime on earned income may result in high 
net income replacement ratios for the recipient's household, in 
partjcular at the lower end of the wage scale. Where such high 
net replacement ratios coincide with a long maximum duration 
on benefit, there is a presumption that the benefit recipient's in-
centive to accept a job offer may be weakened, and he/she may 
thus stay unduly long on benefit. This long spell out of work may 
eventually lead the unemployed to lose contact with the labour 
market and become a long-term unemployed, whose re-in-
tegration to work is increasingly difficult and costly to achieve 
( 'unemployment trap'). 
An option to break up wage floors involves enhancing the unem-
ployed's willingness to take up a job offer, even if low paid, by 
providing in-work benefits which supplement the household in-
come attaining a certain socially-agreed minimum level. How-
ever, in these cases, both the withdrawal rate of benefits and the 
'phasing' into the tax regime implicitly create a high effective 
marginal tax rate applied on additional earnings earned at work. 
In consequence, recipients have little or no possibility to up-
grade in the earnings scale and enhance his/her own skills and 
productivity. Economic, technological and regulatory barriers 
also contribute to 'lock up' these persons in low-paid, low-pro-
ductive jobs with limited alternative opportunities ('poverty trap '). 
The review of the current unemployment protection systems re-
veals, among other conclusions, that: 
• under certain circumstances, the gap between disposable in-
come at work and that received on unemployment benefit 
may be too narrow, thereby supporting the presumption that 
an 'unemployment trap' may occur. Such 'traps' would affect 
in particular the low-income households, specially if children 
and day-care allowances are taken into account, and the 
maximum duration of benefits is relatively long 
• in those cases where the unemployed qualify for unemploy-
ment assistance (UA) benefits, which most often provide a 
lower replacement rate, complementary benefits (e.g. hous-
ing benefits, children and day-care allowances) may also 
generate high net replacement ratios and increase the risk for 
'unemployment traps' to occur. 
• where providing in-work benefits is the alternative chosen, 
reforms have been necessary to soften the very high effective 
marginal tax rates created by the combination of the benefit 
withdrawal rate and the 'phasing' into standard tax regime for 
individuals at or close to the threshold for benefit entitlement. 
These reforms, whilst reducing the risk of 'poverty traps', 
have however led to the spreading of the in-work benefits to 
larger numbers in the occupied population, thus entailing a 
heavy cost in terms of public resources and tax expenditure. 
• since social benefits are means-tested, conditional and often 
earmarked, there is an incentive for the unemployed to be 
transferred onto neighbouring protection schemes, with rela-
tively generous benefits and/or looser eligibility criteria (e.g. 
sickness, temporary or permanent invalidity, early retire-
ment). 
• the multiplicity of social protection schemes and/or a loose 
administration of them may allow for employers and, in some 
cases, employees to collude and provoke the occurrence of re-
peated unemployment spells. This problem matters in par-
ticular sectors subject to a highly seasonal demand (e.g. tour-
ism, transport, building and civil engineering2 or undergoing 
state-monitored restructuring policies. 
To summarize, the actual functioning of the welfare systems in 
many European countries may, under certain circumstances, 
give disincentives for low-income individuals to take up a job 
offer. The alternative option to get them to a low-paid job while 
supporting their income level appears to commit considerable 
public resources and risks 'locking up' individuals at the low 
end of the earnings scale. In each option there is always some 
leeway to introduce further improvements, in order to maintain 
both efficiency and equity and contribute to a more flexible 
functioning of the labour market, a higher level of employment 
and a reduction in structural unemployment. 
4. National actions to promote employment: 
a global assessment 
National Actions and the Essen Strategy for Employment 
All Member States see the current economic recovery as the 
opportunity to be seized in order to make progress in the com-
bat against unemployment, and have renewed and enhanced 
their employment policies after the wide-ranging reforms in-
troduced in the eighties. The numerous measures taken by the 
Member States are broadly in line with the employment strat-
egy defined at Essen and Cannes. This strategy seeks to intro-
duce a more active role of employment policies in facilitating 
the better functioning of the labour market, to allow the social 
partners have a greater role in rendering the labour markets 
more flexible, and to preserve the equity and social standards 
typical to the European Social model. 
These measures are surveyed in the annexed summary table, 
broken down according to the five objectives agreed by the 
European Council in Essen in December 1994. 
The wide range of national measures recently taken can be 
grouped as follows: 
• upgrading the skills of low-productive labour 
Some Member States have reviewed the functioning of the 
education, training and retraining systems, to reduce the number 
This explains that these sectors often have a specific unemployment protec-
tion regime, financed through experience-rated conlrihutions based on the 
enterprises' employment records. 
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of individuals (mainly, youths and females) entering the labour 
market with low or none qualification. These reforms aim at 
providing an easier access to market-oriented training which 
combines the theoretical formation with experience at work, as 
well as to ensure a smooth transition from school to work. In the 
short run, specific measures have been introduced to enhance 
the employability of the long-term unemployed by targeting 
publis:-provided training to upgrade low-skilled labour, and to 
guarantee a minimum professional qualification to new entrants 
(esp. youths, females). 
• reducing the total cost of labour 
The functioning of the welfare schemes has been reassessed in 
many Member States in order to promote a more active search 
for work by benefit recipients. allow their progressive upgrad-
ing along the wage scale, and ensuring the budgetary sustain-
ability of current welfare systems. The unemployment benefit 
schemes have been reformed to narrow down the eligibility cri-
teria, shorten their duration, introduce or reinforce the means-
testing, ensure a stricter enforcement of entitlement rules and a 
closer link between the duration of benefit entitlement and work 
availability tests, as well as a better coordination with other ad-
ministrative bodies in the labour market establishing a more ef-
fective link between income support and the participation in ac-
tive employment measures. ln some cases, the reforms have 
aimed to break up 'implicit' wage floors generated by the inter-
action between the tax and benefit systems, which would be act-
ing as a barrier for low-skilled unemployed to have access to a 
job. Temporary waivers ('entry wages') from standard wage and 
working conditions have been introduced when hiring new en-
trants to the labour market (e.g. apprenticeships, etc.). 
Numerous Member countries have also sought to render their la-
bour market more responsive to the changes in the economic 
cycle and labour productivity through reforms which largely de-
centralize the determination of the conditions at work by giving 
bigger scope for collective bargaining among the social 
partners, especially in the determination of wage and working 
time arrangements. 
In response to the shift in labour demand against less skilled Ja-
bour, many Member countries have introduced or reconvened 
tax-funded budget-neutral schemes to reduce social contribu-
tions levied on labour. Most of the schemes allow for selective 
temporary cuts in employer's social contributions, addressed to 
promote the creation of less-productive jobs (especially. in the 
new fields of social and local domains) or additional recruits 
made by enterprises or self-employed, as well as to facilitate the 
hiring of disadvantaged categories of labour (namely new en-
trants, females, long-term unemployed, aged workers or handi-
capped). Some countries put emphasis on general reductions in 
non-wage labour costs. 
• facilitating a higher mobility of labour 
In many Member States, the public employment systems have 
undergone reforms and their funding enhanced in order to im-
prove their performance of job matching, especially for those 
unemployed particularly hard to place. Measures have also 
sought to ensure a closer coordination with those administrative 
bodies responsible for social protection and the provision of oc-
cupational training. Seeking to introduce higher efficiency, the 
public-provided job matching has been opened to competition 
from the private initiative. Further improvement is intended by 
the improved coordination among job placement bodies, even 
across national borders, as a means to allow for the exchange of 
information on vacancies and employment issues. In some 
countries, new measures are being introduced to allow for more 
flexible regulations concerning labour mobility, as well as to 
provide technical and financial assistance for transferring 
workers between sectors or geographical areas. 
A global assessment of the structural policies in the labour 
markets 
The renewed initiatives in national employment policies have 
just recently come into force and the short time elapsed does not 
allow for a proper assessment of their effectiveness. However, 
several Member States have already been able to identify some 
of them as being particularly successful in terms of the goals 
aimed at. Significant progress has been made in fields such as 
higher wage flexibility, improved provision of market-oriented 
vocational and other types of training, more efficient public job 
matching, more flexible arrangements concerning working 
time. 
Broadly speaking, the reforms introduced in the Jabour markets 
since the last decade have contributed to: 
i) promote wage moderation and introduce a closer link 
between wage claims and the situation in the markets, 
thereby contributing to higher price stability: the wide 
range of measures implemented by the Member States since 
the early eighties with the aim to create a more decentra-
lized and flexible wage bargaining, remove most of the 
index-Jinked pay rules, reform the mechanisms of job 
protection, and reinforce the re-employability of the unem-
ployed have all contributed to the current stability of prices, 
in comparison with previous expansionary periods, and will 
help dampening potential wage pressures induced by the re-
covery. Moreover, by reinforcing the link between wages 
and labour productivity, they will contribute to reduce cost 
pressure on tradable goods and help the EU to preserve its 
cost competitiveness. 
ii) adapt labour supply to the changing needs of the aggre-
gate demand: the provision of technical training as well as 
a number of measures intended to facilitate geographical 
and occupational mobility of labour appear to have reduced 
somewhat sectoral and occupational bottlenecks, which are 
growing in a context of intense reallocation of labour and 
other inputs in the economy. This is particularly important 
in a context where investment in productive capital is ex-
pected to take the leading role from exports as the motor for 
growth in the Community. 
iii) redistribute productivity gains across sectors and there-
by increase the employment content of growth: reforms 
aiming at a more flexible wage bargaining and more ample 
scope for collectively-agreed working time arrangements 
have facilitated the change in the relative prices of products 
which entail a transfer of productivity gains from high to 
low productivity sectors. In certain cases, parallel reforms 
to introduce fiercer competition in the goods and services 
markets have been necessary to secure that the prices in the 
high productivity sectors fall relative to those in less pro-
ductive activities. This transfer of gains in productivity 
across the whole economy, through the change in relative 
prices, is essential to allow economic activities in less pro-
ductive sectors, or close to external trade competition, to 
develop more easily and thereby make room for new 
sources of jobs to appear in the social and local domains. 
5. Environment and Growth 
The definition and implementation of the European strategy for 
growth and employment must take into account the preservation 
of a healthy environment. 
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It is by now increasingly recognized that there is no simple lin-
ear relationship between economic growth and pressure on the 
environment. Although an increase in the production of goods 
and services would a priori lead to an increase in resource use 
and pollution, countervailing forces - like technical progress, 
structural change and increasing preferences for a clean envi-
ronment - frequently tend to compensate for this increase. One 
can therefore say that, provided an appropriate policy frame-
work is put in place, there is no inherent conflict between econ-
omic development and the environment. In fact, in the long run, 
economic prosperity is likely to depend on a healthy environment. 
One of the main conditions for a harmonious development of 
economic activity and the environment is that, in line with the 
polluter pays principle, market participants receive the right 
price signals. Only if market prices reflect not only private, but 
also environmental costs, will it be possible to reach a path of 
environmentally sustainable economic growth. However, in 
order to precisely assess and monitor the impact economic 
growth has on the environment, and vice versa, statistical tools 
have to be made available, in particular by better integrating 
national economic accounts and environmental statistics. 
In this context, there is a lively public debate on the potential 
contribution that environmental policies can make to employ-
ment creation. Although it has to be stressed that environmental 
policies should be pursued in their own right, it is nevertheless 
appropriate to assess the likely employment effects of environ-
mental policy initiatives. Overall, a well devised policy mix in-
cluding environmental policies could have positive effects on 
employment. Such a policy mix could involve the use of rev-
enues levied from taxes, which are introduced for environ-
mental purposes, to help to compensate for the cuts in social 
charges paid on labour in order to secure the consolidation of 
public accounts underway. Therefore, there is indeed evidence 
to suggest that the European Union's future environmental ob-
jectives can be reached at a lower cost to consumers, producers 
and society as a whole (and therefore free resources for produc-
tive purposes), if the largely regulatory approach of the past is 
replaced by a strategy relying to a greater extent than at present 
on a close integration of economic, fiscal and environmental po-
licies. 
6. Policy Recommendations 
The reforms taking place must be pushed forward if the current 
economic recovery is to deliver a decisive improvement in the 
employment situation in the European Union. The favourable 
climate created by the economic expansion offers a unique op-
portunity for further progress to be made, with the view to real-
ize the employment targets of the White Paper. 
Policy actions need to be pursued or strengthened in the follow-
ing domains: 
Supporting the achievement of sound and durable growth 
• the achievement of a strong and sustainable medium-term 
growth is a prerequisite for the ultimate success of a reduction 
in unemployment. Since employment is very sensitive to vari-
ations in the growth trend, it is necessary to implement with 
continuity and determination the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines, first presented in December 1993 and recon-
firmed in July 1994 and 1995. In particular, the growth of 
nominal wages must remain moderate and the policy towards 
sounder budgetary positions be consistently pursued. 
Securing a better functioning in the goods and services 
markets and the preservation of a healthy environment 
• although the Essen strategy focuses essentially on labour 
market issues, it must be stressed that the well functioning of 
goods and services markets is important to ensure high job 
creation in the medium run. Relying on non-competitive 
market structures is self-defeating in the longer run, also from 
the point of view of employment. The competitive pressure 
brought about by the completion of the internal market needs 
to be supported by a vigorous competition policy. Further-
more, a number of structural constraints need to be lifted in 
order to exploit fully the potential for enterprise and employ-
ment creation of the service sector. 
• environmental policies should, to a greater extent than at 
present, rely on market-based policy instruments for reaching 
environmental policy objectives. Such instruments provide 
individual economic agents with the flexibility to look for the 
best way to reduce the pressure they exert on the environment 
and thereby allow least-cost solutions to environmental prob-
lems to be found. In addition, public authorities have a signifi-
cant role to play, for example by eliminating environmentally 
harmful subsidies and by ensuring that the tax system rewards 
environmentally friendly behaviour. Some Member States 
felt that attention should, where necessary, be paid to modify-
ing tax structures in ways which are likely to favour employ-
ment and benefit the environment, as stated in the broad 
guidelines of the economic policies. 
Reforming the labour markets 
• better targeting of training prov1s10n: pnonty must be 
given to enhance the employability of less qualified or obsol-
ete labour by providing market-oriented training to the labour 
force. A too 'generalist' approach should be avoided as it de-
livers poor results from a cost-benefit viewpoint while com-
mitting a substantial amount of public funds. A well-tailored 
design and effective targeting to the less-skilled unemployed 
is a key to enhance the effectiveness of these policies to pro-
mote employment. Measures to reinforce labour's commit-
ment to increase productivity and promote a more stable work 
force in the enterprise are necessary in order to enhance the 
efficiency of this training provision. 
• reviewing the tax burden at the lower end of the earnings 
scale: the tax regime on lower income levels should be re-
viewed in order to remove undue barriers to work resulting 
from regressive tax schedules in both income tax and social 
security contributions (e.g. ceilings/floors for contributions 
vs. tax credits). Although evidence suggests that the overall 
effects on aggregate labour supply appear to be inconclusive 
and contradictory, low-productive jobs and part-time work 
would most likely be particularly responsive to changes in the 
marginal tax rate on earnings. This is important since part-
time jobs have recently been an important source of employ-
ment creation in many Member States. 
• making total labour cost more flexible for the lower 
skilled: Beside general reductions in non-wage labour costs 
targeted cuts in employer's social contributions could be rein-
forced to promote the creation of less-productive jobs (es-
pecially, in the new fields of social and local domains) or en-
courage additional recruits by enterprises or self-employed. 
The actual costs involved in hiring disadvantaged labour cat-
egories (e.g. new entrants, females, long-term unemployed, 
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aged workers or handicapped) must be assessed and their ac-
cess to work be facilitated. For instance, 'entry wages' could 
be extended providing temporary waivers from regulatory or 
conventional pay minima. It is however essential to carefully 
design these measures in order to avoid an eventual 'lock up' 
of these workers in low-paid jobs. 
• ensuring both efficiency and equity in the functioning of 
the social protection systems: reforms should be addressed 
to remove undue disincentives for the benefit recipient to take 
up a job, enforcing a closer control on his willingness/avail-
ability for work ( e.g. what is considered to be an 'acceptable 
job'), and providing technical and financial assistance in their 
active search for work. To tackle 'hidden' transfers of unem-
ployed to different welfare schemes, which strain the financ-
ing of the welfare state, it is important to review the eligibility 
criteria and ensure a more efficient administration and en-
forcement of those welfare schemes neighbouring the unem-
ployment protection function. 
• facilitating a higher labour mobility: measures should be 
taken to remove structural and regulatory barriers to geo-
graphical mobility (e.g. ensuring an adequate degree of port-
ability of pension and complementary benefits) and sectoral 
mobility (e.g. allowing for an easier and cheap mutual re-
cognition of professional categories for comparative tasks 
across sectors). A closer look should be paid to the current oc-
cupational demarcations within the firm, established by re-
gulations and collective agreements. In these areas, it is con-
venient to give a larger scope for collective bargaining to 
determine the content of the reforms, so as to ensure a better 
acceptance of the changes and secure that the latter meet the 
needs in the labour market. 
• securing a better job matching in the labour market: 
public employment systems should need to give priority to 
providing more efficient job matching in particular for those 
labour categories particularly hard to place. Opening the job 
matching to private initiative may help introducing higher 
efficiency through competition, although it must be avoided 
that private employment services 'cream off' the unemployed 
by assisting only easier-to-place individuals. Furthermore, 
the exchange of information on job offers between the differ-
ent job placement bodies within and between Member coun-
tries should be promoted further. There is ample scope for 
sharing national best practices in these areas. 
• reforming employment security provisions: excessive re-
gulation of dismissals and employment contracts can hinder 
necessary structural change and deter employers from hiring 
labour. Workers must be protected against unfair dismissal, 
discrimination and health and safety risks, but the benefits of 
regulation need to be better balanced against the costs. 
With a view to further analyzing the employment evolution and 
to provide guidance for further lines for national policy action, it 
might be helpful to examine in more depth the following issues: 
- to pursue the analysis on the tax/benefit systems and the func-
tioning of the labour market, 
- the link between well functioning goods and services markets 
and employment, 
- the problems related to the financing of the social protection 
systems, and 
- the flexibility of wages both at macroeconomic and micro-
economic levels. 
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ACTION TAKEN IN NATIONAL LABOUR MARKET POLICIES 
(SUMMARY TABLE) 
Policy Areas/Problems ( Essen Mandate) I 
Labour Market Institutions 
(EPC Repo,ts) 
* vocational/continuing 
on-the-job training 
* transition to work from school/ 
vocational training 
* labour contracts 
(e.g. part-time, temporary and 
other non-standard contracts) 
* working time regulations/ 
arrangements (e.g. annualisation, 
overtime, leave schemes) 
* wage flexibility and wage minima 
* social protection schemes 
(entitlement and level of benefit, 
enforcement and administration) 
* indirect labour costs 
(esp . SS contributions) 
* labour turnover costs 
* labour mobility 
* employment subsidies 
Country Panorama 
Vocational Training 
All Member States have undertaken short- and medium-term action to reduce the scale of 
the skills mismatch between labour supply and demand. Thus, a number of initiatives are 
underway to overhaul the whole vocational training system and the way public funds are 
spent on training. 
Overall, the emphasis has been on the provision of more market-oriented public-funded 
vocational training, in particular addressed to low- or unqualified youngsters (especially, 
through apprenticeship schemes). 
Furthermore and based on the assessment of previous experiences, many of the short-run 
reforms aim at ensuring an efficient targeting of the bulk of the public outlays, in particular by 
narrowing the policy approach to introduce new training measures intended to enhance the 
currently unemployed's working skills. 
In some Member countries, schemes have been introduced for funding on-the-job trainee-
ship for unemployed youngsters combined with a temporary experience at a paid work with 
the same employer. 
Employment-Growth Intensity 
Most countries have eased regulatory constraints on temporary and part-time contracts, in 
order to provide flexibility in hiring labour. The regulatory and tax regimes on employees 
have been reviewed in many countries with regard to the non-standard labour forms (esp. 
part-time), with the view to removing undue obstacles to the spread of these types of work-
ing relationship. 
Some Member States have pursued policies to create a more flexible distribution of working 
time by reforming the regulations in force, so as to allow social partners to generalize more 
flexible patterns in the framework of the collective bargaining process. Most countries have 
de-regulated or legalized the recourse to interim and temporary work. Given the successful 
take-up since their appearance in some countries, public-funded schemes allowing for tem-
porary leaves and career breaks by individuals have become permanent in most cases, except 
for the sabbatical leave of which the conditions have been tightened. 
Some public guidelines for wage moderation have been followed in most countries, in par-
ticular by giving an example of greater wage moderation and pay flexibility within the sphere 
of the public sector. In some countries, a nationally-wide policy of wage moderation has 
been considered to have greatly contributed to a relatively successful record in employment 
creation. 
Welfare schemes (in particular, those closely related to unemployment) have been or are ex-
tensively reviewed in all Member countries. Many reforms have aimed at tightening the 
eligibility rules in order to e.g. take account of non-standard employment records (that is, 
seasonal or recurrent short unemployment spells). Closer co-ordination with the Public Em-
ployment Service has been aimed at, so as to enable a better control for the recipient 's will-
ingness or availability for work; furthermore, the recipient's discretion to judge a job offer as 
'acceptable' has been narrowed in many Member States. Finally, the amount or duration of 
some unemployment and social benefits are being reduced or indexed in such a way that the 
gap between income at and out of work is widened, thereby acting as an incentive for the 
unemployed to actively search for work. 
Non-Wage Labour Costs 
Numerous general tax-funded schemes intended to reduce employer-paid social security 
contributions have been established or reconvened in most of Member States, providing 
either across-the-board hiring, or targeted reductions for new recruits at the lower end of the 
wage scale. Such targeted reductions in social charges are often combined with other 
measures intended to provide easier access to work for targeted categories of unemployed. 
Active Labour Market Measures 
In a number of Member States, different measures have been introduced to support geo-
graphical labour mobility. In particular, these address to easing barriers to mobility orig-
inated in the (rental) housing market, as well as selective financial support to afford re-ac-
commodation costs. 
Wage and hiring subsidies are often used in combination with other measures intended to 
encourage hiring of labour, often targeted to particular labour categories. In some cases, ac-
cess to these schemes is conditional on a net creation of jobs. Schemes for providing finan-
cial and technical assistance for small business start-ups have been reassessed and en-
hanced . 
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Active Labour Market Measures (continued) 
* job search assistance and other employ-
ment services 
In many countries, the Public Employment Services are being reformed by easing their over-
burden with administrative tasks and thereby free more resources for improving the quality 
and success of their job matching ( often at a more decentralized level), in particular by focus-
ing on the difficult-to-place job seekers. These reforms also intend to achieve a better co-or-
dination with the authorities responsible for the administration of welfare benefits. In some 
countries, the job matching has been opened to private employment agencies as well. The 
introduction of specific allowances to finance the individual's job search becomes general-
ized in many Member States. 
Groups Particularly hit by Unemployment 
Numerous measures have been taken to encourage hiring among the (very) long-term unem-
* specific job-creation programmes 
ployed (LTU), the benefit-recipients, the low-qualified youngsters or other specific cat-
egories of disadvantaged labour (e.g. females, immigrants, aged workers, handicapped). 
Most of these programmes combine an employment subsidy, or temporary reduction in 
employer-paid social charges, with more flexible forms of labour contract. 
* targeted job-search assistance 
Special programmes for assistance and guidance in job search for these categories have in-
troduced a more active role by the Public Employment Agencies, most often combined with 
the unemployed's participation in training programmes addressed to his/her working skills. 
Most countries have eased regulations on temporary and part-time contracts, in order to pro-
* specific wage arrangements 
(e.g. entry wages) 
* specific types of flexible contracts 
vide flexibility in hiring and to facilitate access to work for particular categories of the unem-
ployed (LTU and first job seekers). Special contracts provide an (often) indefinite duration, a 
lump-sum or temporary wage subsidy, and/or reduced social charges. In some cases. the new 
recruits are temporarily exempted from coverage of regulatory/conventional wage minima 
and general working standards are not applicable (e.g. job protection, health insurance, pen-
sion rights, etc.). 
* specific social protection Recently, some countries have allowed unemployment benefit recipients to temporarily con-
arrangements (entitlement and level of tinue receiving the benefit if accepting a job offer involve~ a substantial loss of earnings com-
benefit, control and administration) pared to the previous level of earnings. 
ANNEX I : SOCIAL BENEFITS, TAXATION 
AND THE LABOUR MARKET 
1. Introduction 
In this annex to its Report on Employment, the ECO/FIN-Coun-
cil presents the first results on its examination of the "effects of 
tax and support systems on the readiness both to create and to 
take up jobs".3 This report concentrates in particular on the rela-
tion between taxation and the unemployment protection system. 
A summary of Member States' responses to a questionnaire on 
the national tax/benefit systems is attached at Annex Ic. 
2. Background 
Although this Report responds to the policy priority given to 
assessing the effects of tax/benefit systems on the incentives of 
economic agents to take up or create jobs, it must be noted that 
this relates only to part of the unemployment problem. Much of 
the negative employment performance in the Community and 
the corresponding dangers for budgetary sustainability of social 
protection systems across Member countries is related mainly to 
macroeconomic and other structural variables. 
Since the early eighties. public expenditure on unemployment 
protection has risen substantially in all Member States in re-
sponse to the overall high level of unemployment, which in-
creased both the size of target groups to be protected and the ex-
tent of social protection itself. Measured in 1985 prices, for the 
Community as a whole, public expenditure on unemployment 
compensation increased by 60 per cent, in 1980-92. In countries 
such as GR, F, IRL and P, it grew at twice the average increase, 
as compared with the much smaller increases recorded in B and 
I. In terms of the share of GDP in 1992, unemployment com-
European Council Meeting, 9th and I 0th December l 994 in Essen, Presiden-
cy Conclusions, Economic Issues, point 5. 
pensation outlays ranged between 3 per cent or more (e.g. E. 
DK, NL and IRL) to Jess than I per cent in L. P, D. GR and I.4 
Systems of social protection have three basic functions in rela-
tion to the event of being unemployed: 
i) to insure employees against the possibility of loss of earn-
ings should they become unemployed (an unemployment 
insurance function), 
ii) to encourage a reasonably speedy return to work whilst al-
lowing the unemployed to find a vacancy suited to their 
working skills (an efficient job matching function). and 
iii) to supplement a household's income up to some minimum 
living standard when the bread-winner or any other 
member becomes unemployed (a social protection jimc-
tion). 
The functioning of social protection systems may, however, 
give rise to problems in a number of ways. 
Concerning the supply side of the labour market. the following 
efficiency problems arise: 
• for those who are out of work, social benefits may result in 
high net replacement ratios which, when combined with long 
durations on benefit, may weaken the incentive lo engage in 
active job search, thus producing longer spells in receipt of 
benefit. This increases the risk of creating a hard-core of 
long-term unemployed. 
• for those who take up a low paid job supplemented with in-
work benefits, additional gross earnings can lead to high im-
plicit effective marginal tax rates. via the onset of income 
taxes, employee social security charges and benefit with-
drawal. This creates 'poverty traps' in the sense that those tak-
ing up low paid jobs have little or no incentive to seek in-
creased skills and productivity in order to obtain higher paid 
4 EUROSTAT. Social Protection in the Eumpcan Union, Rapid Reports on 
Population and Social Conditions. 5, I 994. 
jobs. Economic, technological and regulatory barriers often 
lock such individual in low productivity jobs with limited al-
ternative opportunities. Poverty traps reduce incentives and 
labour mobility and have adverse effects on structural unem-
ployment. 
• the structure of personal income taxation may affect the indi-
vidual's willingness to increase the number of hours worked 
or perhaps, to take up a job in the official economy; this is like-
ly to affect in particular, part-time employees. More gen-
erally, high effective marginal rates of taxation affect not only 
the size of registered labour supply but also the effectiveness 
of this labour supply, as they can contribute to high rates of 
structural unemployment. 
• the administration and enforcement of eligibility and entitle-
ment conditions depend upon the size of the population re-
ceiving social protection and the agents' perception of the 
overall economic situation. Moreover, problems in the design 
and policing of rules become more transparent when some of 
the unemployed have the opportunity to move on to other so-
cial protection schemes such as sickness, invalidity and early 
retirement programmes, where the benefits may be more gen-
erous, thus creating strains elsewhere in the system. 
Turning to the demand side of the labour market, problems re-
late to: 
• an employer 's willingness to hire people responds to the evol-
ution of total labour costs; indirect or non-wage costs may 
constrain the employer's willingness to create jobs, to the ex-
tent that such costs are (a) not perceived by the economic ag-
ents as being a part of labour's total remuneration and (b) be-
cause they are intrinsically less variable and responsive to the 
economic cycle, at least in the short run. 
Both analysis and empirical evidence suggest that lower 
skilled labour is particularly affected by a relatively higher ri-
gidity in total labour costs, given that many non-wage costs 
components are not proportional to wages. 
In order to avoid creating a class of "working poor" through 
widening the wage scale, the Commission's White Paper has 
recommended that lower indirect labour costs be realised 
through targeted reductions in employer's social security con-
tributions as a policy priority; a recommendation which has 
been re-iterated at the Essen Summit. 
In addition, some analysis suggest that benefits which are too 
generous may generate a wage floor which compresses the wage 
distribution and locks out the lower skilled from employment. 
Further, an excessive burden of taxation on labour may affect 
negatively the overall level of employment, induce too much 
capital deepening and also harm price competitiveness in in-
ternational markets. Also, there are stronger incentives to en-
gage in fraud and to increase the size of the "black economy". 
The disincentive or labour market efficiency problems men-
tioned above, need to be assessed against the social protection 
function of the benefit system itself. The income support mech-
anism has had a place of considerable importance in the way the 
so-called European social model has developed from the early 
sixties. Comparisons are often drawn with the United States in 
which its smaller welfare state may help in explaining its su-
perior job creation record. However, this feature of US economy 
has been accompanied by important equity problems due to 
downwards pressure on real earnings for the lower skill groups, 
a widening earnings distribution and the creation of a class of 
people who are in work but nevertheless, have very low incom-
es. Indeed recent reforms in the US have extended the social 
protection system somewhat in order to tackle the emergence of 
these social imbalances. 
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Reforms of European labour markets should aim at increasing 
adjustment flexibility and at introducing greater wage differ-
entiation with respect to qualifications of workers on the one 
hand, and with respect to sectoral and regional productivity 
divergences on the other. Experience indicates that in many 
cases, an individual worker prefers a low paid job rather than 
being unemployed. Nevertheless, the policy challenge is one of 
maintaining a satisfactory level of social protection overall , 
whilst improving the operational efficiency of labour markets 
and securing the sustainability of the costs of social protection 
systems compatible with the agreed macroeconomic fiscal 
policy of budgetary consolidation. 
A simple summary of the main characteristics of Tax and Bene-
fit systems in the Community and how they relate to the supply 
and demand sides of the labour market are set out in Annex la 
and le, attached to this Report. 
3. Assessment of problems in the Member States 
3.1 Major approaches to social protection 
The diversity across the Union in the coverage and structure of 
social protection systems responds to the different needs in each 
country as well as to historical circumstances under which these 
structures have developed (see annex la and le). 
Although there is no single, specific European approach or sys-
tem, an overall view of the different national systems suggests 
that there are two broad approaches to social protection in case 
of unemployment. 
A first approach which is seen in the social protection systems of 
many Member States is to provide high coverage, both in terms 
of replacement income and benefit duration especially for low 
incomes. Traditionally, both elements appear to have been par-
ticularly generous in the Nordic countries, where high net re-
placement ratios for lower incomes have been maintained over a 
long period of duration of benefits. However, the receipt of 
benefit is fairly closely linked to participation in a wide range of 
active labour market policies, in particular, professional train-
ing and job guarantee programmes so as to enhance the unem-
ployed's working skills. 
As unemployment has risen and has remained high in most of 
the Member countries, the budgetary burden of financing these 
systems has become very costly. Attention has turned to tighten-
ing of enforcement and control procedures as well as to reasses-
sing eligibility conditions. 
As a variant to this first type of unemployment protection sys-
tem, a number of Member States (F, FIN, D, E) provide fairly 
generous benefits at the beginning of an unemployment spell, 
but the level of protection is gradually reduced fairly quickly 
over time, so as to create a progressively higher income loss and 
thereby increasing the incentive to fill existing job vacancies. 
A second approach is that followed in the UK and to some extent 
IRL, where unemployment protection systems provide less 
coverage in both replacement income and benefit duration, so as 
to increase the gap between in work and out of work incomes. 
These systems are intended to encourage the unemployed to fill 
existing vacancies and then supplement earnings up to a mini-
mum social income level. These in-work benefits may repre-
sent a substantial share in public expenditure, depending on the 
target population covered. Further, policy priority is given to la-
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bour market policies to address efficient job search and place-
ment for the unemployed. 
3.2 Assessment of the problems 
In highly simplified terms, a number of trade-offs emerge, both 
within and between the above broad classes of systems. 
Within the first type, the additional cost of enforcement, re-de-
finitions of eligibility and active policing have to be balanced 
against the perceived need to maintain the levels of protection 
offered. In the second type, the costs of in-work benefits and ac-
tive policies are balanced against the objective of getting people 
into work and the additional output which they produce. 
Between the two systems, there is a further trade-off between 
the size of the' unemployment trap' which is induced by high out 
of work benefits and the scale of the 'poverty trap' faced by 
those in work and which is created under the second approach. 
Looking at the problems and the policy reactions in Member 
States in more detail, we observe the following: 
• in those cases where net replacement incomes for the lowest 
income levels are very high, there may be the presumption 
that benefit recipients will be caught in an 'unemployment 
trap', with few incentives to take up a job. In most cases, such 
'traps' may be expected to occur in low-income households, 
especially those with children, in DK, IRL, NL and FIN. 
Further, this possible disincentive effect applies in particular, 
to low skilled workers who are at greatest risk in becoming un-
employed. However, this potential problem must be balanced 
against the need to prevent a household's income from falling 
below a socially acceptable level. 
• the presumption of a potential 'unemployment trap' becomes 
stronger in those cases where benefit duration is relatively 
long (e.g. B, DK, FIN, S, NL). While long administrative dur-
ation per se does not necessarily create disincentives to work, 
evidence suggests that such durations on benefit may induce 
lower skilled individuals to lose contact with the labour 
market thereby deteriorating their human capital. Early ac-
tion through active labour market measures is needed to pre-
vent this.5 
• a problem of moral hazard relates to the fact that the multi-
plicity of social protection schemes and/or a looser adminis-
tration may offer the possibility for employers and in some 
cases, employees to collude, so as to influence the occurrence 
of unemployment spells. This problem appears to affect in 
particular, those sectors subject to highly seasonal demand 
(e.g. tourism in Austria, transport6 or those subject to restruc-
turing). 
• the transition from unemployment insurance to assistance 
benefits often implies a lower income replacement ratio. 
Hence, there is an incentive for the unemployed to move or to 
be transferred to other social schemes where the benefits pro-
vided may be more generous or eligibility criteria are more 
loosely applied. This is, or until recently, has been, a problem 
in DK, I, NL and the UK. It is therefore important to review 
current enforcement of eligibility criteria with more efficient 
administration of these protection schemes. This will help to 
avoid unnecessary budgetary strains. 
For instance, the Danish government has just proposed a combination of ear-
lier activation and shm1er benefit duration. 
This explains, for example. that the housing and civil engineering sectors 
have a specific unemployment protection regime with special contributory 
rules. in particular based on more experience-rating for the enterprises· con-
tributions. 
• most often, the presence of children or family dependents en-
titles the household to receive additional social benefits, 
which are often flat-rate and may represent a significant com-
plement for the household income, particularly at lower levels 
of earnings. In cases where receiving those benefits is incom-
patible with any paid work, a clear disincentive problem ar-
ises for the members of the household to take up a job, in par-
ticular in single-parent households. 
• almost all countries have introduced measures to improve 
eligibility criteria and job availability tests and enforcement. 
Most measures aim to provide a more effective link between 
benefit receipt and active job search, better assistance from 
public employment services and tighter control on eligibility 
for unemployment and other related social protection 
schemes. 
• the role of active labour market policies is important, particu-
larly to provide better targeted assistance, to encourage the 
unemployed to return to work through training programmes 
with regular screening for job availability. Nordic countries 
have long experience with such policies and almost all 
Member States are now moving in this direction. However, 
active policies in the labour market are often expensive in 
budgetary terms and the design and effective targeting of such 
policies is a key to their effectiveness. 
• whilst the effects of marginal rates of high income tax on the 
labour supply is probably small in the aggregate, evidence 
points strongly to part-time-employees, particularly fe-
males, as being relatively responsive to such tax changes. It is 
to be noted that part-time jobs have recently been a particular-
ly important source of employment creation in many Member 
States. The tax regime applied to the lower income levels 
should be reviewed, in order to remove undue barriers to work 
by introducing less regressive tax schedules in both income 
taxes and employees contributions to social security schemes. 
For example, the effect of the different ceilings/t1oors in con-
tributions should be assessed together with the relevance of 
tax credits for the lower incomes. 
• as indicated in the strategy agreed in the Commission's White 
Paper, and re-iterated at the Essen Summit, a reduction in the 
level of indirect labour costs for the low paid has become a 
policy priority. Most Member States are introducing a wide 
range of different schemes providing a general or selective 
exemption of (mostly employer's) social security contribu-
tions, on either a temporary or permanent basis. However, 
those schemes targeted towards the low paid should avoid 
creating excessive marginal increases for labour with earn-
ings close to, or at the eligibility threshold for contribution 
cuts. 
4. Conclusions 
Historically, the social protection and taxation systems have de-
veloped in response to many different policy demands and pres-
sures. The possible unintended disincentives which distort the 
functioning of the labour market are only one dimension of this 
process. The currently difficult situation in overall employment 
and the public finances have highlighted the potential incentive 
problems derived from the existence of a reduced gap between 
in work and out of work incomes, possibly long durations on 
benefit, the possibility of high implicit effective marginal tax 
rates, relatively high non-wage costs for the low skilled and the 
equity costs of an uneven structure of marginal tax rates. 
Within the Union, Member States are addressing these problems 
in a variety of ways. To stimulate willingness to take up jobs, a 
broad consensus is beginning to emerge regarding the better 
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targeting of benefits, tighter enforcement and control and a 
closer linkage to active labour market policies. 
An alternative approach, currently limited to the UK and, to a 
certain extent, IRL is to give a more active role to wages as a 
means of introducing more flexibility in the functioning of the 
labour market, combined with in-work benefits addressed to 
encourage taking up a job whilst ensuring that low incomes 
earners attain a social minimum level. 
From the standpoint of the willingness to create jobs, across-
the-board or selective cuts in employer's social contributions 
have become the policy means to ease the burden of non-wage 
costs upon labour, in particular for the low skilled jobs. 
The broad systems in the Community suggest the question of 
policy trade-offs between an unemployment trap which reduces 
incentives to work and a poverty trap reducing incentives to 
seek higher skills and better paid jobs. Some acceptable balance 
between the two has to be found. At this stage, the Committee 
can offer no clear answer to the question as to which strategy 
offers the best solution to higher employment and prosperity. 
Thus it is not suggested that any one approach to social protec-
tion and labour taxation is in some sense "best". A number of 
different trade-offs suggest that policy choices exist in each 
Member State. What is clear, is that each system or 'approach' 
allows for some leeway to introduce further improvements in 
both efficiency and equity whilst making the functioning of the 
labour market more flexible, thereby generating a higher level 
of employment and securing a reduction in structural unem-
ployment. 
Annex I a : Main Characteristics of Tax/Benefit 
Systems Relevant to the Unemployed 
There is a very large amount of diversity in social benefits and 
tax systems across the Union. Whilst comparisons are difficult, 
ome typical characteristics relate to the following: 
Benefits out of Work: 
Gross/Net Replacement Ratios 
Measured at average earnings, replacement ratios from unem-
ployment insurance benefits tend to be fairly high in many 
Member countries, falling in the range of 55-85 per cent of the 
average production worker's income; the UK being lower with 
some 20-50 per cent. The figures for lower income earners are 
higher both in gross and net terms, amounting to 75-95 per cent 
in many Member States. Unemployment assistance and other 
social benefits alone produce markedly lower net replacement 
ratios, although the addition of earmarked tax-free benefits, in 
particular, child and housing allowances can lead to very high 
net replacement ratios for some low income households in coun-
tries such as Denmark, Netherlands, Finland and Sweden. 
Duration and Time Profile of Unemployment Benefits 7 
High net replacement ratios from unemployment benefits may 
give rise to the presumption of an incentive problem if com-
bined with relatively long duration on benefit. The longest en-
titlement periods for unemployment insurance benefit are in 
It should be noted that the maximum duration periods indicated here are the 
maximum entitlement for benefit for an insured employed with a long, stan-
dard work history. Only data from administrative sources can provide in-
formation on how long benefit recipients actually stay on benefit. It is diffi-
cult to make meaningful comparisons across countries from data on gross 
labour turnover flows from the Labour Force Surveys. 
Belgium and Sweden (sometimes unlimited) and Finland 
(12 years), followed by Denmark, France and Netherlands (5 to 
7 years). 
As to the time profile of benefits, different approaches can be 
identified. Whereas some countries (UK and IRL) maintain a 
roughly constant flat-rate benefit at a relatively lower level, 
others (e.g. DK, S) maintain a fairly high level over time com-
bined with a range of active labour market policies (mainly, 
vocational training and temporary job guarantee programmes). 
Other Member countries can be grouped closer to the latter ap-
proach, although with lower levels of protection. 
It is worth recalling however that the benefit rate typically de-
clines over time in many countries (e.g. FIN, E, D) and that long 
durations apply to few individuals with a long, standard work 
history and often include mandatory breaks for job training or 
temporary work. Further, any cross-country comparisons must 
take account of the fact that some countries tend to place unem-
ployed groups, transferred from unemployment protection sys-
tems to other social schemes with longer or unlimited durations, 
particularly various kinds of early retirement and disability 
schemes. 
Administration and En/ orcement 
The existence of long maximum permitted benefit duration, 
places greater responsibility on the benefit enforcement pro-
cedures to ensure that the system is not placed under strain. The 
increasing complexity of social benefit programmes and their 
interaction, together with continuing high unemployment, has 
led to a majority of Member States experiencing difficulties in 
applying and enforcing rules as required by legislated eligibility 
criteria. 
The majority of Member countries have progressively intro-
duced a number of reforms in the unemployment protection sys-
tems; tightening the definition and enforcement of the eligibil-
ity criteria, providing closer control and assistance for an active 
job search, and improving exchange of information between the 
administrative bodies in charge of benefit administration and 
job placement services. 
Benefits in Work: 
Implicit Marginal Tax Rates 
In some countries, the combination of a low-paid job with the 
receipt of in-work social benefits can result in some individ-
uals/households facing high implicit effective marginal tax 
rates. However, the very highest implicit marginal rates are con-
centrated in some low income groups and in principle, the 
numbers of individuals affected are likely to be very few. 
The UK has introduced reforms which lower these implicit mar-
ginal tax rates, such that the latter cannot exceed I 00 per cent , 
on a net income basis. However, these reforms have generated a 
further problem, the UK being the example, that the group af-
fected by implicit marginal tax rates of 70-80 per cent amounts 
to some 5 per cent of the working population. 
Taxes on Labour Income 
In most countries of the Union, over the past decade, personal 
income tax structures have been streamlined and simplified. In 
particular, top marginal tax rates have been reduced. However, 
these reductions have often made those with incomes above the 
average relatively better off, whilst the income tax burden for 
those at lower income levels has increased. These reforms have 
also tended to reduce the gap between incomes in and out of 
work. For those in work, a risk is that higher average tax rates 
can increase pressure for wage demands. 
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To calculate the effective tax burden levied on individual's in-
come is a complicated exercise. When employee's social secur-
ity contributions arc included, marginal tax rates at average 
earnings fall in the range of 45-57 per cent in many Member 
States, with B, DK and I being the highest and with Sand the UK 
the lowest, with a marginal rate of 35 per cent. 8 
Further, the net 'take-home' pay received by a worker differs 
substantially from the gross earnings paid by the employer and 
to a different extent across Member countries. In this respect, 
the disposable income for a single average-wage employee in 
the manufacturing sector can range from some 60 per cent of 
gross earnings (B, D, IRL) to 73 per cent in F, I and the UK and, 
at the highest, 82 per cent in P. 9 
Taxation on Labour Demand: 
Indirect Labour Costs 
The issues here are well known, given that the need to lower 
these costs is an important component of both the White Paper 
strategy and the Essen action points. Indirect or non-wage costs 
comprise mainly statutory and conventional social security con-
tributions, other smaller costs being e.g. expenditure on voca-
tional training. 
The share of non-wage or indirect costs in total labour cost 
varies considerably across Member countries, ranfiing from less 
than 4 per cent in DK to 31 per cent in S in 1992. O Employer's 
social security contributions are by far the biggest indirect cost 
in all Member States. As a percentage of total labour costs, 
statutory employer's social security contributions range from 
25-30 per cent (S, F, I, E, and B) to l-15 per cent (DK, IRL. L 
and the UK). The different institutional framework helps to ex-
plain the marked disparity across Member countries. 
See OECD, Taxation, Benefit and Emplonnent, 1994. 
Indirect taxes and social welfare benefits are not taken into account in the 
calculation. See EUROSTAT, Net Earnings of Employees in Manufacturing 
industry in the European Union, 1994. 
IO Provisional figures from the EC Labour Cost Survey 1992. 
Annex I b : Social Benefits, Taxation and The Labour Market Summary of National Responses to the 
Questionnaires 
B 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
Replacement Ratios 
Significant d1sinccn1ivc for low 
earners (single parents particularly) lo 
enter Jabour market. But very few af-
fected. RR at av. earnings 40-60% 
(gross); 52.--75</r (net). For minirncx 
recipient<.; no incentive to take any job 
below 80'X of full time. 
In 1992, 3or1r of families receiving 
.substantial replacement benefits had 
NRR's>90%. By 199.1, 24'+ of llB re-
cipients had GRR's>90'/, with 54'X 
having rates <8(VY,. Very high (95r;',) 
for tho-;c on 1/2 average earning.'> long 
duration - up to 7 years on UB -- but 
dependent on number of foctors. Must 
be available for work. 
UB on average represents 6()<;,;- of !he 
most recent net earning.'>, whereas UA 
is about SO<k. For some, is 12 week 
delay before receipt of benefit. Signifi-
cant gaps between net income and so-
cial as:-.i~tance, depending on family 
type. Riggcst work inccnti\cs for 
.single people. 
UB is about 50(/r of mi111mum wage, 
su~jcct tu entitlement conditiorn,. 
For lJI. RR 'sin range 60-70'/,. For l/A 
Marginal Tax Rates 
Concentration of MTR's in range 
45-60%. Very .small number could 
hcrve high rates(> 70'lr) 
Income tax rate of O <)t of the first in-
come bracket extended for an mldi-
tional 300,000 GDr into tbc second in-
come bracket for salaried employees. 
Employee social security contribu-
tions arc proportional. The total 
amount, however, doc~ not increase 
after a certain level or salary (no dis-
incentive for skilled personnel). 
Big problcrm for low skilled have 
Non-Wage Costs 
High costs to discourage overtime. 
Low costs in DK - 2-3% (due to alter-
native financing method, tax funded}. 
Importance increases in 1994 - will 
rise to ~.67. by 199R on employe,,s 
and l .6r}'c, on employers. 
Reform of social protection systems 
with a view to reducing non-wage la-
bour costs and increasing incentives to 
work in preparation and expected to 
come into effect in 1996. 
Employment subsidisation pro-
gramme targeted towards the most 
vulnerable. Is untaxed and not subject 
to employer's contributions. 
Social security contributions cut by 
is 7:i-125'/r but of the minimum wage. been corrected by (aJ benefits being one percentage point. 
taxable (h) rcduction.s in RR's. 
For UB recipients on lo\v earning<.,, For tho-;e at the RMI. recent reforms Reductions targeted al the low wages 
RR 's 75(/c, gross and 9(Yi net. For have smoothed implicit tax rates to en- as a way to encourage new hirings. 
tho.se on RMI, RR '.s at the SMJC courage job take-up. 
50-9()(/( accordmg: lo family circum-
stances. 
Benefit Duration/ Administration 
Indefinite benefit duration is possible 
- in practice, there are work availabil-
ity tests. More restricted eligibility 
rules an<l stronger enforcement result-
ing from more recent measures. 
Very long U!-duration (7 years) poss-
ible, but subject to work availability 
tests. Tighter enforcement introduced, 
cornhining sanctions an<l possible loss 
of benefits. 
Link UB to active job search, condi-
tional on being offered a suitable job at 
least within the first year. Afterwards. 
benefit recipient must be willing to 
take up a job requiring lower qualifica-
tions; close linkage al.so with ALM Po-
licies 
Duration on benefit related to days 
worked - runs up to 12 months on UB 
- encourages participation .. 
UB-duration linked to contribution 
record. Rights to UB related to job 
offers or training/re-training. Some 
problems of control at local level. 
UB related to previous work experi-
~nce. Controls exerci\cd e.g. involve 
work tests, acceptance of Training/ap-
prenticeships - active joh search 
IRL 
L 
NL 
A 
p 
-, 
FI 
s 
UK 
Replacement Ratios 
Prior to I 992, some RR 's exceeded 
I 00%. In I 995/96, general level has 
fallen - at bottom, could be 80-88%. 
9.5% of the unemployed could face 
RR's >80%, 44.8% face RR 's >60% 
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Marginal Tax Rates 
High EMTR can exist through interac-
tion of Family Benefit withdrawal and 
tax system. Maximum rate could be 
I 00% - but estimated that very small 
numbers could be affected. With-
- based on actual take-up of benefits. drawal rates of children allowances 
likely to create disincentives for 
households with children; refom1 un-
derway to link allowances for depend-
ent children to income level criteria, 
away from employment status or uni-
ver al payments. Tax reforms taken to 
reduce marginal tax wedges for lower 
incomes (!R£ 9.000-12,000), 
Earnings Guarantee Fund system 
implies an administrative RR of 80%, 
-extended UB (Mobilita) also. Ordi-
nary U B coverage much lower, and 
with a RR of 30% of previous earn-
ings. 
Tough controls on unemployed's 
availability for job explain suggest 
that the UB system does not generate 
disincentives to take up a job. Almost 
50% of unemployed return to work 
after I to 3 months' unemployment 
spell. 
For families on minimum income 
level , RR is 100% (net). For single 
people (both at minimum and average 
income levels) and for the APW, 70% 
gross and 80% net. Wage related bene-
fit is 70% of previous wage. Ba ic and 
longer term UB are both 70% of the 
minimum wage. 
UI (base amount: 60%) plus other 
benefits may produce a net- replace-
ment rate of up to 80%. No floor for 
UB benefits; social assistance ad-
dressed to top up minimum income 
level. Recently introduced a negative 
tax option up to I 0% of social con-
tributions paid by the employee, with 
the view to reducing the tax wedge and 
favouring job take- up. 
For those at or close to the minimum 
wage, high replacement ratios - 88%. 
UB duration vary with age in the range 
10--30 months. Special benefit for 
those no longer on UB - can be up 10 
I 00% of minimum wage depending on 
family circumstances. 
For UB alone, net RR 'sat or below av-
erage earnings often falls in range 
85-95%. For some other benefits at 
bouom of earnings scale, can be up 
I 07%. Considerable variation accord-
ing to type of benefit. 
Net RR 80--95% up to average earn-
ings for UB. But can be very low 
(20--30%) if not in receipt of UI benefit 
biggest disincentives are for families 
with children. Disincentives removed 
through tighter job-search require-
ments. 
5% of working population have RR 's 
>70%; very small numbers >100%. 
Incidence of very high RR ·s have been 
reduced by adopting net earnings as 
reference and by easier access to Fam-
ily Credit. Experiments underway to 
improve incentives for childless 
couples and single people. Faster ad-
ministration of in- work benefits. 
Income taxes on average not thought 
to produce major disincentives to la-
bour supply. 
Income taxes remain very low for UB 
recipeints. They do not negatively in-
fluence thelabour supply. 
Over the whole income range, the mar-
ginal tax rate is 60%. Combination of 
benefit withdrawal (including Hous-
ing subsidies) plus tax and social con-
tributions can produce EMTR 's close 
to I 00% for small numbers at the bot-
tom. 
No serious problems with implicit 
EMTRs - but benefit eligibility for 
part-time workers can lead to 'free-
rider ' effects by which part-timers 
substitute for full- time workers. 
For most family types, is concentra-
tion of MTR's at 40--60%. Small 
numbers of unemployed with rates 
> 70--80%. when other social benefits 
included. Disincentive problem re-
lated to children home care support. 
Very small number of MTR 's >80% 
(estimated for 1995). Significant 
numbers could fall in the range 
30--60%. Single parents and families 
with two children plus are particularly 
vulnerable, and further reforms are en-
visaged. 
Benefits assessed on a oo income 
basis; hence are no MTR's >100% -
but are larger numbers in range 
65-80%, due to the in-work benefit. 
This is softened by reassessing eligi-
bility only at six monthly intervals. 
Disincentives because child-care, 
mortgage relieves. and test of cohabit-
ant's earnings 
Non-Wage Costs 
Main employer's contribution rate is 
12.2%. Since 1994/95, cut to 9% for 
the lower paid to raise demand for 
jobs. 
Highest level of employer's contribu-
tions in the Union. NWLCs appear to 
be shifted on to labour in lower wages. 
Reduction in social contribution rates 
for the young unskilled of 25%, with 
50% in the South. 
Social security contributions at a I 0% 
flat rate. They do not actually appear 
as a disincentive to create jobs. 
At minimum wage, can be high at 19% 
of total labour costs (regressive social 
contributions, which are 22% at aver-
age earnings but fall at higher levels). 
Levied at flat rate starting at lowest le-
vels but with upper limit. Al low in-
comes, only small disincentives be-
cause of steep wage profile. Council 
payroll tax has been increased both in 
the rate and the taxable basis (lower 
rates for SMEs). 
Total rate is similar across wage scale 
(about 26% of total costs, with 2 I .6% 
paid by the employer). 
Overall constant proportion across 
earnings range of 28.5%. Allocation 
criteria for wage subsidies have been 
tightened up. 
Small differences by income level e.g. 
Employers contributions at - average 
earnings - 24%; at average earnings 
- 27%. Temporary wage subsidies 
exist for some parts of labour market 
programmes. 
Progressive scale of employer con-
tributions from 3% for 25% average 
earnings, up to I 0.2% at 75% of gross 
pay. Recent reduction of rates, esp. for 
lower paid. Still problem of jumps in 
the marginal rates. 
Benefit Duration/ Administration 
UB for 15 months - then move to 
long- term assistance (means tested). 
Benefits linked to work availability 
criteria. Refusal can lead to loss of 
benefit. 
Both ESF and Mobilita can run for 12 
months - but extended for older 
workers and in ''crisis" regions (Mez-
zogiomo). 
Unemployment benefits are provided 
for a period of 24 months. They 
amount to 80% of previous wages. up 
to a maximum of 250% of the social 
minimum wage (42.677 Flux in 1995). 
Benefit durations are long; UB up to 6 
years. older employees can receive UB 
up to 7.5 years. UA has infinite dur-
ation up to pension age. Benefit ad-
ministration agencies are not involved 
with the re-entry of unemployed into 
the labour market. 
Duration linked to contribution. re-
cord and age. Checks on eligibility 
and are work tests with sanctions. 
Duration of UB related to age - runs 
from I O months at 25 years to 30 
months at 55 years. Regular checks on 
claimants involving Social Security 
agencies 
UH-duration up to almost 2 years - is 
a 26 week previous work condition. 
Recent legislation has tightened rules 
and criteria. 
UI max. duration is 60 weeks, but can 
be extended if training is undertaken. 
Benefit levels not related to duration. 
Enhanced work tests and training re-
quirements. Tighter controls in qual-
ifying for sickness benefits. 
U B runs for 12 months - work tests and 
training requirements with benefit 
sanctions (up to 26 weeks). New Job 
seeker's Allowance, with tighter job 
availability. Faster administration of 
in-work benefits. Bonus applied to 
shifts from part-time to full-time jobs. 
Annex I a: Unemployment Protection in the EU: Description of the Insurance (UI) and Assistance (UA) Schemes (May 1995) 
(general schemes of unemployment protection, except those for early retirement or partial unemployment). 
s: MISSOC (1994); EPC (1994); OECD Jobs Study (1994); OECD Employment Outlook (1991). 
B DK D GR E F IRL I L NL A p 
Principle: 
1. UI J. ye<:- I. yes I. yes I. yes l. yes I. yes 1. yes I. yes l. yes I. yes I. yes I. yes 
2.UA 2. yes 2. yes 2. yes 2. yes 2. yes fb1 2. yes 2. yes 2. yes 
Max. Duration: 
1. UI ilim. 48 m (a) l.156-S32d I. 5-12 m I. 4-24 m I. 4-60 rn I. 390d I. 6---48 m 12-24 m I. 6-60m I. 20-52 w l. 10-30 m 
2. UA 2. ilim. 2. 18 rn 2. 3-21 rn 2. ilim. 2. ilim. 2. 12--l8m 2. 6-24 m 2. ilim. 2. 5-30 rn 
Earnings of Reference: 
1. UI 
I a. a.g.e. 
a.g.e. a.g.e. l. a.n.c. tn. \V. l. b. SSc. I a.g.e. I a.g.e. a.g.e. a.g.c. lb. m.w. I a.n.e. J. a.g.e. 
2. UA 2. a.n.e. 2. m. \V. 2. a.g.e. 2. a.g.e. 2. u.i. 2. m.w. 
Nominal Rates: ( % of ref. earn.) 
I a.40.4o/r + 
FF55.3 or 
la. UI full rate la. 55--{,() 90 la. 67--fiO la. 56 la. 70 57.4'!c ( l) la. IR£ 61.0 I. 30--80 la. 80 la. 70 I. 57 la. 65 
lb. Ul reduced rate I b. 35-60 lb. 50 lb. 60 lb. deer. lb. (2) lb. 70 
2. UA rate 2. 57-53 2.75-125 2.tlat amount 2. !Rf 58.9 -6 l.O 2. 80--60 2. 70-40 2.flat amount 2. 90-95 2. 70-100 
Rate Decreasing over time yes no no yes yes yes no yes no yes no no 
Benefit Ceiling and/or Floor both ceil. ceiL both both both ceil. ceil. ceil. yes yes yes 
Benefit Modulated to Family 
Circumstances I. no I. no 
{ children/income-earningspouse) yes no yes yes 2. (yes) no yes no yes yes yes 2. yes 
Tax Liability part. full part. part. full part. part. part. full full no no 
Key: Max. Duration: d.= days, m. = months, ilim. = no limit. Benefit duration is often longer for older unemployed (D, F, [, L, NL .. ) or particular regions(!). 
FIN 
I. yes 
2. yes 
1. 500 d 
2. ilirn. (aJ 
a.g.e. 
I a. UA benefit 
+ 20--42% 
wage-related 
2. 118 FJM/d 
110 
no 
yes 
full 
Earnings of Reference: a.1;.e. = gross earnings averaged over a time period, a.n.e. = net earnings averaged over a period of time, /st.e. = gross earnings when becoming unemployed, 
b. SSc. = averaged SS contribution assessment basis, 111. u: = statutory minimum wages, u.i. = amount of UI benefit previously received. 
Note: In some cases (D, GR and E) the reference earnings typically represent less than 100 per cent of total earnings because of the specific structure of workers' earnings. 
s UK 
I. yes I yes 
2. yes 
I. 15(f.-450d 12m 
2. ilim. (a) 
a. g. e. a.n.e. 
flat amount 
(£45 50 
I. 80 -£75 50) 
no no 
ceil. ceil. 
no (yes) 
full part. 
Benefit Rates: ii I Allocmion Unique Dq;ressil'e: higher replacement ratios for monthly wages below 9700 FF, since the benefit combines a component related to the reference wage (40.4%) with a flat-rate payment. 
The rate decreases every 4 months. flat= flat-rate amount. 
r21 In L. the nominal replacement rate remains al 80 per cent after l 82 days on benefit, although the ceiling for the benefit is progressively reduced over time (from 250 per cent to 150 per cent of social 
minimum wage). First-job seekers holding one or no professional degree are also entitled to assistance benefits (70 per cent and 40 per cent of the social minimum wage, respectively). 
Note: In some countries the benefit rate increases progressively with the age of the beneficiary (F, D, A). the family status or is adjusted to cohabitant's income (B, D, L, FIN, S, UK, P and A) 
Tax Liability: part. = unemployment benefit is considered lo be partially liable to the income tax when .special tax reliefs or special exemptions for unemployed exist (esp. for the lower-income earners). 
Notes: (al Job-Guarantee programmes (e.g. in Scandinavian countries) often allow long-term unemployed to qualify for further UB entitlement, thereby prolonging the duration of the benefits almost indefinitely. 
(bJ Although originally designed as a short-time work scheme, the effective functioning of the Special Earnings Fund (Cassa lntegrazione Guadagni ordinaria/straordinaria) makes it similar to an insurance-based scheme (esp. 
concerning CJG beneficiaries working very few orno hours), in addition to the low-coverage fonnal ordinary UI benefit (Sussidio Ordinario di Dissoccupazione). Similarly, the Mobility allowance (Sussidio di Mohiliti1) would appear 
to effectively operate like an UA scheme. To participate in both schemes, employers must contribute on an experience-rated basis. 
if 
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ANNEX II : ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT: THE MAIN ISSUES 
1. Introduction 
In this annex to its report on employment the ECO/FIN-Council 
presents its main findings on the issue of"Economic Growth and 
the Environment" referring in particular to 
- the relationship between economic growth and environment 
(part 2) 
- the choice of the most suitable environmental policy instru-
ment (part 3) 
- the potential environmental and employment gains from a tax 
reform (part 4). 
2. The relationship between economic growth 
and the environment 
As set out in the Commission's Communication ("Economic 
Growth and the Environment: Some Implications for Economic 
Policy Making" (COM(94)465)), there is no linear relation hip 
between economic growth and its impact on the environment. 
This is mainly due to the fact that technologies tend to become 
more efficient over time, that the composition of economic activ-
ity changes towards less pollution- and resource-intensive sec-
tors and that the demand for environmental quality increases with 
economic prosperity. As a result, there are many types of envi-
ronmental problems that either have continuously decreased in 
line with economic growth (see the example oflack of safe drink-
ing water in graph la) or that have first increased and then de-
creased (inverted U-shaped, S02 in graph lb). On the other 
hand, there are also a number of environmental pressures where a 
clear positive relationship with economic growth can be detected 
(e.g. C02 emissions, graph le, or reduction in biodiversity). It is 
worth noting, in this context, that a number of these growing pres-
sures seem to be related to private transport. This is borne out, for 
instance, by graph 2, showing the past and expected trends in sec-
toral C02 emissions. 
What is important to stress, however, is that in most cases where 
environmental problems have been reduced in parallel with econ-
omic growth, this has been, at least partly, due to policy interven-
tions. This is true for local environmental problems like lead 
emissions from transport (see graph 3), as well as for global is-
sues like chlorofluorcarbons (CFCs) the phasing-out of which 
has been agreed under the Montreal Protocol concerning sub-
stances destroying the ozone layer. 
The above examples clearly illustrate that there is no unambigu-
ous linear relationship between economic growth and pressure on 
the environment. In order to assess whether the present economic 
growth trend in the EU is altogether environmentally sustainable 
or not, the trends of the different environmental pressures there-
fore have to be aggregated so as to provide an overa11 picture. Un-
fortunately, there are no adequate statistical tools, yet, to a1Jow 
such an overall assessment. While there are already well estab-
lished economic accounts, allowing a comparatively precise 
measurement of economic activity, no such genera1Jy accepted 
aggregate indicator exists yet for changes to the environment. 
For this reason, the Commission has recently proposed a work 
programme for the EU concerning the development of integrated 
economic and environmental accounts, focusing on the develop-
ment of Environmental Indicators and "Greening" of NationaJ 
Accounts (COM(94)670). 
GRAPH I : Illustrative examples for the relationship between per 
capita GDP and environmental pressure 
GRAPH I a : Lack of wast water treatment facilities in EUR-15 
(1970 to early 1990s) 
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GRAPH lb : S0x emissions and economic growth in Italy 
( 1970-1990) 
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GRAPH le : C02 emissions and economic growth in EUR-9 
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GRAPH 2. :Sectoral C02 emissions in EUR-12 (]980-2000) 
mio. tC02 
Final consumption of industry 
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1 
Final consumption of transport 
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(2) Reference scenario of the 1992 MIDAS simulations. 
Source: Eurostat, Commission services. 
GRAPH 3. : Lead emissions from road transport and related policy 
measures - The Netherlands 1980-1993 
Lead emission estimates (tonnes) 
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GRAPH 4. : Environmental pressures, environmental expenditures 
and GDP-The Netherlands 1980-1991 
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Source: Adriaanse ( 1993). Commission services, Ereco. 
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At the national level. some Member States have already relative-
ly well developed integrated economic and environmental ac-
counting systems, allowing useful input into the policy evalu-
ation. The Netherlands, for example, has developed a system of 
environmental pressure indices, allowing progress of environ-
mental policies to be closely monitored. Although the amount of 
progress made in the past decade varies between environmental 
areas, it appears that, on the whole, the Netherlands has been able 
to decouple economic growth from pressure on the environment 
(see graph 4 ). Denmark has also established a system of environ-
mental pressure indices and is presently implementing a strategic 
environmental planning process, ranging from objective setting 
to continuous monitoring and progress assessment routines. It is 
presently impossible to say, however, whether other Member 
States have made similar progress. The lack of comparable in-
formation systems in other Member States underlines the desir-
ability of the above-mentioned coordinated work programme. 
3. The choice of the most suitable environmental 
policy instrument 
Even though traditional regulation will still have an important 
role to play in the future, there is by now a broad agreement in 
Europe on the desirability of a more widespread use of market-
based instruments in environmental policy. This paradigm shift 
has been highlighted by the 5th Environmental Action Pro-
gramme and the Commission's Communication on Economic 
Growth and the Environment. By improving the cost-effective-
ness of environmental policies (see Box I), a greater use of 
market-based policy instruments will ensure that any possible 
negative effects of environmental policies on economic growth 
are minimised. In addition, there should of course, wherever 
possible, be an appropriate comparison of the potential costs and 
benefits to the environment and the various economic variables 
affected, of action or lack of action, not only in the area of the 
environmental policy, and not only at the Community level. 
As to the appropriate choice of policy instruments, such a deci-
sion should always be undertaken in view of the environmental 
characteristics of the specific environmental problem at hand. 
Nevertheless, a few general observations can be made: 
• Traditional regulation is generally best suited in cases where 
direct health hazards are involved (e.g. toxic chemicals) or 
where, for different reasons, the market mechanism is unlikely 
lo work (e.g. lack of information or awareness). It can also be 
well suited in cases of particularly sensitive ecosystems and 
when biodiversity is threatened. It will therefore continue to be 
a cornerstone of environmental policies. 
• Environmental taxes and charges are potentially an attractive 
solution when the environmental problem is ( closely) related to 
the purchase or use of a product (e.g. the combustion of fossil 
fuels in the case ofC02 emissions) and where a large number of 
economic subjects are involved. Although the main purpose of 
such fiscal instruments is to change behaviour and not to raise 
revenues, most environmental taxes will have the side-effect 
of raising revenues as long as the costs of pollution avoidance 
are not close to zero. If this results in an undesirable increase in 
the overall tax burden, appropriate ways have to be found for 
reducing the tax burden elsewhere in the economy. 
• Tradable permits or certificates could be an attractive option 
when the aim is to reach a specific quantitative (emission) 
target and when the number of participants is neither too small 
(problems of market power and thin market), nor too large 
(problem of high transaction costs). Potential applications 
could include, for example, S02 emissions from large combus-
tion plants. One of the main issues, when setting up a tradable 
permit scheme, is the initial allocation of permits or emission 
rights. In practice, most schemes issue permits to participants 
on the basis of their present (or past) pollution. Although this 
type of allocation helps overcoming resistance to the introduc-
tion of tradable permit schemes, it has the disadvantage of im-
plicitly rewarding those who have undertaken little abatement 
effort in the past. An alternative allocation mechanism would 
consist of auctioning the permits, thereby raising revenues 
similarly to those associated to the introduction of environ-
mental taxes. To date, very little practical experience with trad-
able permit schemes exists in Europe and it is unlikely that such 
a type of instrument will play a major role in the near future. 
However, in the USA the system has been applied in several 
cases 
• Voluntary or negotiated agreements are usually best suited for 
cases where only a limited number of companies are involved 
(low transaction costs), where these companies are well orga-
nised at branch level, where the costs of the agreed environ-
mental measure are small (in order to reduce free rider incen-
tives) and where there is a credible threat of sanction in the case 
of non-compliance. On the other hand, such agreements have 
the disadvantage that there is little transparency about the costs 
of an environmental measure, that they are unlikely to be dy-
namically efficient (no economic incentives to improve agreed 
standards) and, moreover, that there is the risk of collusion 
(anti-competitive behaviour). It is worth mentioning that 
some Member States, in particular the Netherlands, have had a 
positive experience with such agreements. In the Community 
context, negotiated agreements could in principle either be 
used at the national level , for example in order to implement 
Community law, or directly at the Community level. While in 
the former case the implications for competition and state aid 
policy have to be assessed, issues of representativeness and en-
forceability would have to be dealt with in the latter case. 
• Finally, there are a number of other instrnments, like civil lia-
bility schemes, deposit refund systems or financial incentives, 
that can play a useful role in environmental policy. Here as 
well, it has to be carefully analysed which degree of co-ordina-
tion or harmonisation within the EU is required in order to cope 
with environmental problems as well as to preserve the smooth 
functioning of the Internal Market. 
In practice, it might often be attractive to combine two (or even 
more) policy instruments. Voluntary/negotiated agreements, for 
example, could in specific circumstances be used in cases where 
certain branches are exempt from environmental taxes, while 
trading schemes could complement traditional regulation. In any 
event, it is important that such instruments are introduced grad-
ually and predictably in order to avoid unnecessary adjustment 
costs. One further important condition for the successful applica-
tion of market-based instruments should be mentioned in this 
context. By definition, such instruments can only fulfil their role 
if it is possible to organise properly functioning markets, close to 
the environmental externality of concern. Moreover, such instrn-
ments should not simply be superimposed on existing structures 
(e.g. tax systems), but should ideally be part of a comprehensive 
effort to improve the functioning of markets and to reduce the dis-
tortions introduced by taxation. 
A look at the present use of different types of policy instruments 
in the European Union reveals a predominance of traditional re-
gulation at the national level, and even more so at the Community 
level. To some extent, this might also be due to the fact that the 
costs imposed by regulation are usually hidden while they are 
only too visible for market-based policy instruments I ike envi-
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TABLE I : Economic instruments per country on 1.1.1992 
Charges 
Charges on on prod-
emissions* ucts** 
Denmark 3 (2) LO (2) 
Germany 5 (2) 3 (3) 
Nether- 5 (2) 4 (2) lands 
Belgium 7 (2) 2 (2) 
Portugal 4(1) 3 (I) 
France 5 (2) 2 (I) 
Italy 3 (2) 2 (0) 
Ireland 2 (2) l (I) 
Greece 2 ( I) 
Spain 3 (2) 
UK l(l) 
Sweden 3(2) 11(2) 
Finland 3(2) 10(2) 
Norway 4(2) 8(2) 
Austria 3(1) 4(2) 
USA 5(2) 6(1) 
Japan 3(1) l(l) 
Switzerland 3(2) 2(2) 
Australia 5(2) 1(0) 
Canada 3(2) 7(3) 
* of which user charges. 
** of which tax differentiations. 
Enforce-
Deposit Tradable ment 
refunds permits incentives 
2 
2 
2 
I 
3 
1(1) 
4 
2 
3 
3 
4 
I 
3 
4 
l 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Source: OECD, Integrating Environmem and Economics: the Role of 
Economic Instruments, May 1993. 
ronmental taxes. As a result it i often politically more difficult to 
use "economic instruments" instead of"command-and-control" 
types of legislation. In some Member States, however, consider-
able use is being made of fiscal instruments (see table I) . Such 
environmental taxes and charges most frequently refer to 
emissions to air (C02, S02, NOx), to water (effluent charges) or 
to waste (packaging or landfill charges). On the other hand, there 
are only very few cases oftradable permit schemes, in particular 
when compared to the United States. 
With respect to the role of the European Union, several aspects 
are worth mentioning. 
• Firstly, attention should be given to potential institutional 
barriers to a more widespread use of the market mechanism in 
environmental policies. There is indeed the risk that the exist-
ing Council voting rules could introduce an instrument selec-
tion bias to the detriment of market-based policy instruments 
like environmental taxes and charges. While, for example, 
technical emission standards are likely to merely require a 
qualified majority (in the Environment Council), economically 
more efficient emission charges would necessitate unanimity 
(in the ECOFIN Council). 
• Secondly, diverging local conditions, preferences and tradi-
tions imply that each environmental problem should be dealt 
with the most appropriate hierarchical level (local, regional, 
national, Community-wide, international ). Thus, in line with 
the subsidiarity principle, Community-wide environmental is-
sues are preferable whenever the dimension of a pecific envi-
ronmental problem is Community-wide, or even global. 
Clearly, the more international environmental problems will be 
addressed by action only taken by individual Member States or 
sub-groups of Member States, the more not only will the cost-
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TABLE 2: Sectoral (direct) production cost increases due to a US$ 3/b and a US$ 10/b COifenergy tax, Belgium 
NACE Energy cost share 
Fuel price increase 
due to I O $/b tax 
Fuel price increase 
due to 3 $lb tax 
Direct production 
cost increase 
due to 10 $ tax 
Direct production 
cost increase 
due to 3 $ tax 
(%) (%) 
Sensitive sectors 
Hard coal extraction Ill 14.39 51.5 
Gener. and distr. of power 161 20.08 5 l.5 
Gener. and distr. of steam [63 49.06 5 l.5 
Iron and steel 221 15.ll 5 l.3 
Extract. of other minerals 239 [2.42 44.7 
Clay products 241 13.15 44.3 
Cement 242 16.96 44.3 
Glass 247 5.86 44.3 
Moderately sensitive sectors 
Coke ovens 120 7.27 58.0 
Water supply 170 4.38 44.7 
Extract of build. materials 231 7.32 44.7 
Stone, non-met. minerals 245 l l.56 44.3 
Ceramics 248 5.46 44.3 
Basic chemicals 251 4.98 39.3 
Man-made fibres 260 5.19 39.3 
Foundries 311 6.l 38.l 
Starch products 418 5.97 40.0 
Textile finishing 437 5.32 39.9 
Semi-finished wood prod. 462 3.7 40.2 
Pulp, paper and board 471 5.98 40.l 
Source: INS/NSl, Eurostat, Commission services. 
effectiveness of such policies deteriorate, but the effects on 
intra-EU competitiveness will also increase. As individual 
Member States are likely to be tempted to shield exposed sec-
tors from such negative effects, the Community's competition 
and state aid policy will have to ensure that explicit or hidden 
subsidies do not impair the functioning of the Internal Market. 
Thus. there are significant benefits to be reaped from coordi-
nating policies within the EU. However, often national policies 
to curb international environmental problems are needed at an 
initial stage in order to promote a process that can eventually 
result in action at the EU level. 
• Thirdly, even in cases where the environmental problem is not 
of a Community-wide nature, there may be advantages from 
having a coordinated Community response. This could be the 
case, for example, when there are significant economies of 
scale or when the national set of policy instruments is severely 
restricted by Community law (e.g. product standards in the 
context of the Internal Market). In some of these cases the use 
of market-based policy instruments could be facilitated at the 
national level by preparing guidelines setting out the con-
straints imposed by Community legislation (e.g. in the area of 
state aid and competition policy). 
The above-mentioned potential intra-EU competitiveness issues 
that can arise by addressing global externalities with national 
measures can be illustrated by the case of uncoordinated, national 
C02/energy taxes. Preliminary analysis undertaken by the Com-
mission services ( see graphs 5 and 6) points towards the con-
clusion that national C02/encrgy taxes introduced unilaterally or 
in a small group of Member States at significant rates could have 
some negative competitiveness impacts for a small number of en-
ergy intensive sectors. However, from a macroeconomic per-
spective, these impacts would not be of significant importance, if 
a number of conditions are fulfilled (the tax is gradually phased 
in, flexible markets allow enterprises to adapt to changes in input 
prices, and the tax is implemented in such a manner that it does 
(%) (%) (%) 
15.5 7.4 2.2 
15.5 I0.3 :u 
15.5 25.3 7.6 
15.4 7.8 2.3 
13.4 5.6 l.7 
13.3 5.8 l.7 
13.3 7.5 2.3 
!3.3 2.6 0.8 
17.4 4.2 l.3 
13.4 2.0 0.6 
13.4 3.3 l.0 
133 5. l l.5 
13.3 2.4 0.7 
11.8 2.0 06 
l l.8 2.0 0.6 
l l.4 2.3 0.7 
12.0 2.4 0.7 
12.0 2. l 0.6 
12.l 1.5 0.4 
12.0 2.4 0.7 
not deteriorate the macroeconomic conditions under which firms 
operate (e.g. by insisting on revenue neutrality of the tax)). 
Nevertheless, both the sectoral and the regional impacts of the in-
troduction of C02/energy taxes deserve further analysis. The 
sectoral competitiveness effects could probably be reduced, if a 
larger subgroup including economically important EU Member 
States were to introduce the tax. Of course, the long-term politi-
cal objective has to be policy action at the broader international 
level. 
4. The potential environmental and employment 
gains from a tax reform 
Economists generally tend to be sceptical as to the possibility of 
having "a free lunch''. Standard textbook economic theory as-
sumes rational behaviour, full information and optimal policies, 
therefore leaving little room for Pareto-improving reforms. 
Moreover, economic theory suggests that the number of policy 
instruments has to be at least as large as the number of policy ob-
jectives in order to reach optimality. Environmental policies 
should therefore not be (ab)used as a means of employment po-
licies and vice versa. In particular, environmental taxes should be 
introduced for internalising the environmental costs of produc-
tion and consumption, and not for raising revenues. However, in 
practice there can be little doubt that there is room for reforms that 
would simultaneously entail economic and environmental bene-
fits. The removal of subsidies to environmentally harmful econ-
omic activities is a good example at hand. Moreover. few would 
argue that existing tax systems are economically optimal either 
from the employment or from the environmental point of view. 
In this context, it is also often advocated to reform existing tax 
and charge systems so as to simultaneously improve employment 
and environmental protection (the so-called "double dividend" 
hypothesis). Such a operation could consist. for example, of the 
introduction of carbon taxes in order to reduce C02 emissions 
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GRAPH 5. : Geographical structure of CORE group (DK, NL, S, FIN) trade in selected sectors 1992 
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18. Pulp. paper and board (47 1) 23 237 605 
1 3U 051540 
19. Total 
I\ 
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(first instrument), combined with a reduction in the burden of 
taxes and charges on employment (second instrument). Al-
though the idea is intuitively appealing, there seems to be broad 
agreement among economists that such a double benefit is un-
certain and is only likely to emerge if certain specific condi-
tions are fulfilled. 
On the labour market side, the main condition for employment 
creation is that a reduction in labour taxes actually reduces total 
labour costs and, consecutively, increases demand for labour. 
Clearly, which change in taxes or charges is the most ap-
propriate for increasing employment strongly depends on the 
economic situation and institutional setting of each individ-
ual Member State. Although, theoretically, a change in labour 
taxes or charges could be fully compensated by changes in real 
wages, for example when such charges are perceived as deferred 
income (e.g. future public pension payments), therefore leaving 
total labour costs unchanged, the empirical evidence for most 
European countries seems to suggest that this is not what hap-
pened in the past. Even though there are significant differences 
between countries, OECD calculations indicate (see Table 3 
taken from the OECD Jobs Study), for example, that, in the past, 
approximately half of an increase in taxes has been shifted for-
ward into higher labour costs. A broad consensus between gov-
ernments, employers and trade unions concerning the desirability 
of a reduction in non-wage labour costs could help ensure that 
this condition for a "double dividend" is fulfilled. Moreover, 
there is reason to believe that the environmental benefits related 
to such an operation can help in reaching such a consensus. A re-
cent European-wide opinion poll (Eurobarometer) indeed 
showed significant public support for the idea of shifting the tax 
burden from income or social security contributions to environ-
mentally harmful products and activities (more than 70% of 
people interviewed agreed strongly or somewhat with the idea), 
indicating that there is scope for a broad consensus. 
With respect to the role of environmental taxes as a source of fi-
nancing for a reduction in non-wage labour costs, a number of 
factors are of importance. Firstly, such environmental taxes or 
charges should be introduced for environmental purposes (and 
not for revenue raising purposes) and should not act as indirect 
taxes on labour. Thus, the burden of environmental taxes should 
not only fall on those in the labour force. Secondly, the revenue 
yield of such taxes has to be sufficiently high and stable in time to 
TABLE 3: Labour cost responses to changes in tax rates (l) 
Elasticity of labour costs with respect to 
Income taxes 
and 
Employers so- Value-added employees' 
cial security taxes and social security 
contributions excises contributions 
Germany 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Canada 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Japan 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Finland 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Australia 0.5 0.5 0.5 
France 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Italy 0.4 OA 0.4 
Sweden 0.0 1.0 0.0 
United States 00 0.0 1.0 
United Kingdom 0.25 0.25 0.25 
( 1 J Since in some countries the effect of income tax systems contains im-
pacts of both average and marginal tax rates, the elasticities in this table 
have been calculated on the assumption that these two rates move con-
jointly 
Source: The OECD Jobs Study. 
TABLE 4 : Carbon tax revenues in a scenario stabilising 
OECD C02 emissions at the 1990 level 
(billion 1985 dollars) 
1995 2000 2005 2030 2050 
USA 55.2 !02.8 117.9 139.4 190.4 
Japan 17.1 35.9 47.4 60.7 97.4 
EUR12 34.7 64.9 74.9 90.9 130.6 
otherOECD 12.6 23.8 27.5 35.3 51.1 
Source: OECD (1994 ). 
be suitable as a source of financing a reduction in labour taxes and 
charges. Both of these conditions could be fulfilled in the case of 
broad-based taxes like, for example, carbon/energy taxes. To 
begin with, part of the energy tax burden is carried by capital and 
transfer income earners as well as foreigners (almost all EU coun-
tries are net importers of carbon fuels). In addition, as mentioned 
above, C02 emissions tend to increase with economic growth, 
and on the other hand real energy prices have now declined for 
several years. The Community's C02 emission limitation objec-
tives are, in fact, such that the expected revenues from carbon/en-
ergy taxes would amount to several bi !lion ECU s per year for the 
foreseeable future. According to OECD calculations (see Table 
4) the carbon tax revenues in the EU resulting from a policy aim-
ing at the mere stabilisation of C02 emissions at their 1990 level 
should rise from approx. 60 billion USD in the year 2000 to more 
than twice that amount by the year 2050. 
It is therefore not surprising to see that several Member States 
have expressed interest in this idea or have even already begun 
moving into this direction. Belgium, for example, is considering 
the introduction of a C02 tax, the revenues of which would be 
used for a targeted reduction in non-wage labour costs (social se-
curity contributions). In a similar vein, Denmark has recently 
adopted a comprehensive package of "green taxes'' on energy 
use, part of the revenues of which should be used for reducing 
taxes on labour income. It is calculated that Danish C02 
emissions will be reduced by 4-5 per cent without negative ef-
fects on employment. In the Netherlands, an energy tax on small 
energy users will be introduced in 1996, the revenues of which 
will be used entirely to lower other taxes, mainly those on Jabour. 
In the United Kingdom, the Chancellor of the Exchequer has an-
nounced his intention to use the revenues from the introduction of 
a landfill tax to reduce national insurance contributions. Admin-
istrations in other Member States are presently evaluating their 
options. It is worth mentioning in this context that most evalu-
ations of the employment effects of such tax reforms arrive at 
only modest employment gains if the measures are not targeted to 
low-wage earners. These potential employment gains will not be 
sufficient to make significant inroads into the European unem-
ployment problems and should, therefore, not deflect attention 
from macroeconomic and structural measures addressing 
the main causes of unemployment. 
5. Conclusions 
There is broad agreement that, provided appropriate policies are 
put in place, there is no inherent conflict between economic 
growth and environmental protection. In order to ensure progress 
towards environmentally sustainable economic growth in the 
European Union, the environmental costs of economic activity 
have to be better reflected in market prices than today. Environ-
mental policies should therefore carefully evaluate the relative 
merits of alternative policy instruments to reach environmental 
policy targets and give, wherever possible, preference to those 
that rely on the market mechanism. In addition, there are benefits 
to be reaped from reviewing existing tax and incentive schemes 
• 
in order to eliminate undesirable economic incentives to pollu-
tion. In cases of significant economies of scale, environmental 
problems of a Community-wide dimension or when national po-
licies are severely constrained by the rules of the Internal Market, 
environmental policies should best be decided upon at the Com-
Box 1 : The advantages of using market-based policy 
instruments in order to tap different channels for 
reducing pressures on the environment 
By internalising environmental costs into market prices, 
market-based policy instruments have a number of advantages 
over traditional "command-and-control" policies. One of 
their main benefits consists of the fact that, in addition to giving 
a permanent economic incentive to reducing the environmental 
pressure, they simultaneously exploit several channels for re-
ducing a given environmental problem. This can best be illus-
trated with the help of a simple example. 
Although this example refers to carbon dioxide (C02) 
emissions (see Graph I), similar arguments could equally be 
applied to many other types of environmental problems. Every 
time a unit of fossil fuel ( coal, oil or natural gas) is burnt, C02 is 
emitted. Being a global externality, the environmental damage 
created by the emission of one ton of C02 is the same whatever 
the origin or location if the emission. As there are, at present, 
no (commercially viable) technologies for exhaust pipe C02 
recovery, putting a uniform tax on the carbon content of fossil 
fuels goes a long way towards an ideal internalisation strategy. 
The main effects of the introduction of such a tax are depicted 
in the graph. By making C02 emissions more expensive, the 
tax will in fact encourage producers as well as consumers to 
look for ways to reduce emissions at least cost. This can be 
done by purchasing a more fuel efficient equipment, by chang-
ing the behaviour ( e.g. driving less kilometres with the private 
car) or by shifting to less C02 intensive economic activities. 
The important point is that each of these mechanisms is only 
exploited up to the point where the marginal costs of reducing 
one more tonne of emission equal the tax rate (T). The potential 
cost savings from adopting such a comprehensive approach be-
come clear when looking at the last panel of the graph. This 
panel illustrates that the costs of reaching a given emission re-
duction target (q1ot) is significantly lower when all available 
GRAPH I: Reduction in carbon dioxide emissions (tonnes) 
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munity level. In other cases, the Community could, in line with 
the subsidiarity principle, facilitate individual or groups of 
Member States to move in the direction of greater reliance on 
market-based policy instruments, for example by preparing 
guidelines concerning the use of such instruments. 
levers are used (light grey area) compared to a policy relying 
only on one lever, say equipment energy efficiency (light grey 
and dark grey area together). 
It could be argued that traditional command-and-control po-
licies could also be designed such that several levers are being 
used ( e.g. equipment energy efficiency standards plus informa-
tion campaigns to change household behaviour). However, 
there are at least two reasons why such an alternative strategy is 
unlikely to be cost-effective in practice. Firstly, only if the 
government/regulator knew the cost curves (MC1, MC2 and 
MC3), could it determine the economically optimal level of 
control (q1, q2 and q3) for each individual lever. In the case of 
market-based policy instruments, this detailed knowledge is 
not needed, as individual economic agents know best their own 
respective costs and the market mechanism will ensure that 
these individual preferences are aggregated to the social cost 
minimum. Secondly, the example also makes clear that, in all 
likelihood, the government would not even have the policy in-
struments for reaching a specific target for all available levers 
( e.g. how should structural change or a change in behaviour be 
mandated?). Market-based policy approaches are therefore 
likely to offer significant cost savings compared to policies that 
do not rely on the internalisation approach. This advantage of 
market-based policy instruments holds true not only for li-
miting carbon dioxide emissions, but equally applies to 
many other environmental problems like waste generation, 
eutrophication, conventional air pollution etc. 
Without going into the details here, it should also be mentioned 
that a similar type of argument that was made in this box con-
cerning the advantages of exploiting different emission reduc-
tion channels can also be made for the desirability of exploiting 
cost differences between different economic sectors or be-
tween individual economic agents. As a result, market-based 
policy instruments have the potential of equalising marginal 
abatement costs across uses, sectors and economic agents, 
thereby allowing a given environmental objective to be re-
ached at least cost to society. 
Market response to a carbon dioxide levy (T) in a perfect market (illustrative example) 
T, 
(a) Improvement in equipment 
energy efficiency 
I 
__________________ i I 
(b) Change in behaviour 
I 
I 
I 
I 
,-
' I 
( c) Structural change 
- ----~-----·----·,--- ------------ -- --1----
q2 qtot q3 qtot 
MC = marginal costs of reducing carbon dioxide emissions. 
(d) Total 
20 November 1995 . 
• 
111111 
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Principal economic policy measures - January 1996 
Community (EUR-15) 
None. 
Belgium (B) 
JO. I The central bank reduces its central rate from 3.75% to 3.70%. 
17. I The central bank reduces its central rate from 3.70% to 3.65%. 
24.1 The central bank reduces its central rate from 3.65% to 3.55%. 
JI.I The central bank reduces its central rate from 3.55% to 3.40%. 
Denmark (DK) 
I I. I The Nationalbank Jowers its repo rate by 10 basis points to 4.50%. 
24.1 The Nationalbank lowers the discount rate by 25 basis points to 
4.00%. The repo rate is lowered by 15 basis points to 4.35%. 
Germany (D) 
30. I The federal government presents a 50-point programme with the 
aim of halving unemployment by the year 2000. This target is to be re-
ached through a wide array of measures to stimulate competitiveness, in-
crease the availability of risk capital, set up a more business-friendly 
environment ( especially for founders of new firms), strengthen research 
and development, and reduce costs created by regulations or by the so-
cial security and fiscal systems. The Federal Minister of Finance an-
nounces that the government plans to reduce the Solidarity surcharge on 
income tax from 7.5% to 5.5% starting I July 1997. 
Greece (GR) 
None. 
Spain (E) 
12. I The Bank of Spain cuts its key money rate by a quarter point to 
8.75% from 9.0% at the regular nine-day repurchase tender for central 
bank certificates. 
France (F) 
18. I The Bank of France cuts its intervention rate to 4.20% from 4.45% 
and its five-to-ten day rate to 5.60% from 5.85%. 
24. I The government approves two decrees implementing the first set of 
measures for the reform of the welfare system. 
30. I The Finance and Economics minister announces new measures 
aimed at boosting consumption and investment. The main measure is the 
reduction in the tax-free interest rate offered on the "Livret A" savings 
bank account. by I percentage point to 3.5%. 
Ireland (IRL) 
23.I The Minister for Finance presents the 1996 Budget to the Dail (Par-
liament). Against a background of projected GDP growth of 5%% and 
inflation of 211t%, the principal features of the Budget include modest 
concessions on income tax, PRSI (social security contributions) and cor-
poration tax, partly offset by increases in indirect taxation, mainly on to-
bacco and fuel. Social welfare payments rise by 3% effective from mid-
year and new measures have been announced to deal with structural 
long-term unemployment. including a weekly recruitment subsidy pay-
able to employers taking on persons out of work for at least three years. 
The target for the general government deficit is 2.6% of GDP, compared 
to2.1%in 1995. 
Italy (I) 
None. 
Luxembourg (L) 
None. 
Austria (A) 
None. 
Netherlands (NL) 
I 8. I The central bank lowers its special advance rate from 3.40% to 
3.30%. 
Portugal (P) 
None. 
Finland (FIN) 
26.1 The government decides to grant a maximum 9% subsidy to ship-
yards' new orders, not totalling more than FMK 180 million. Shipyards 
can apply for the subsidy until the OECD agreement scrapping ship-
building subsidies enters into force, or at the latest until September 1996. 
Sweden (S) 
None. 
United Kingdom (UK) 
18.1 The Chancellor of the Exchequer cuts the minimum lending rate by 
'It% to 61/4% after the regular meeting with the governor of the Bank of 
England. 
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